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Abstract
This report describes an interdisciplinary approach to flood risk analysis and man-
agement that was developed by investigating flood risks in the city of Vienna,
Austria. The purpose of the research was to analyze different policy paths (includ-
ing both flood-prevention measures and risk-sharing financial provisions) in the
presence of major uncertainties. A preliminary analysis resulted in the identifica-
tion of two major methodological issues that needed to be resolved, namely:
• The concept of risk used in flood management varied subtly but significantly
across the disciplines contributing to the assessment.
• Current assessment procedures did not give a full account of uncertainties and
their different types.
For those reasons an approach was developed that allows the analyst: 1) to
integrate the different disciplinary concepts of risk within a single interdisciplinary
analysis; and 2) to take into account uncertainties in a way that not only allows their
many characteristics to be distinguished but is also consistent across the component
disciplines. The focus of this report is the phenomenon of flash flooding of the
Vienna River. Our analysis demonstrated that, in this case, the greatest damage
from flash flooding was to be expected in the Vienna city subway system. The
report thus describes a detailed assessment of the flood risk to the subway and of
related management measures, on which research to date has been scarce.
The results show that an approach based on catastrophe modeling and Monte
Carlo simulation can not only integrate the risk perspectives of the different tech-
nical disciplines contributing to this study but also provide a useful framework
for comparing the characteristics of different mitigation strategies. The results of
the simulations suggest alternatives for combining different mitigation measures to
ensure complementarity among the characteristics of different components of an
overall strategy, and thereby decrease total costs and reduce the likelihood and the
uncertainties of catastrophic financial losses.
Key words: Risk Assessment, Uncertainty Analysis, Risk Management, Catastro-
phe Models, Flash Flood, Subway Flood Risk, Catastrophe Insurance
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1
Introduction and Theoretical
Background
The purpose of this report is to illustrate an interdisciplinary approach to flood risk
analysis that combines hydrological flood risk assessment and simulation modeling
with the finances of flood risk management. Using this interdisciplinary approach,
we examined flood risks in the city of Vienna, Austria, together with some alterna-
tives for mitigation of the damage caused by flooding.
While developing an interdisciplinary approach for examining catastrophic
flood risks, we found that the concept of risk used in flood management varied sub-
tly but significantly across the disciplines contributing to the study. Although such
variations appear subtle, the way in which the term “risk” is conceptualized (e.g.,
as probability, as consequence, as expected value, etc.) can significantly affect the
way in which an analysis produced within a particular discipline is structured. More
importantly, it can significantly affect the conclusions reached about the courses
of action recommended, particularly when a decision maker has to choose from
among very different options developed on the basis of analyses prepared within
different disciplinary frameworks. This can happen, for example, when a decision
maker is trying to decide whether to implement a structural approach (e.g., raise
the height of river levees) or a financial approach (e.g., transfer the risks through
insurance). An important result of this study is the integration of these different dis-
ciplinary concepts of risk within a single interdisciplinary analysis. We also show
that the way in which uncertainty is defined and represented is not consistent across
different disciplines.
This project was carried out within the framework of catastrophe model devel-
opment. In this section we will introduce the reader to the different concepts of risk
that arise within catastrophe modeling. We will first discuss taxonomy of perspec-
tives on risk, show how our approach fits into a larger taxonomy, and then discuss
the way risk is conceptualized in the technical disciplines contributing to this study.
Finally, we discuss the impact of uncertainty in catastrophe modeling and introduce
an approach for integrating multiple concepts of uncertainty into catastrophe mod-
eling. The rest—and majority—of the report (Chapters 2 to 5) presents a concrete
implementation of these ideas in a case study which examines urban flooding in
Vienna. A brief set of general observations and conclusions is presented in Chap-
ter 6.
1
2The approach illustrated in this study will be useful for examining policy paths,
including flood risk mitigation and insurance, that are used to manage the risks
of flooding in Vienna and elsewhere. Our results build on ongoing work at the
Universita¨t fu¨r Bodenkultur (BOKU) in Vienna and IIASA on the development and
use of models for the management of catastrophic risks (Amendola et al., 2000a,
2000b; Brouwers 2003; Ekenberg et al. 2003; Ermoliev et al., 2000; Faber and
Nachtnebel, 2002, 2003; Freeman et al., 2002; Konecny and Nachtnebel, 1985;
Nachtnebel and Faber, 2002; Nachtnebel, 2000; Mechler, 2003). These studies
encompass a wide variety of disciplines, catastrophe types, and spatial and temporal
scales.
As in any analysis, we have operated under significant constraints, some exter-
nal and some self-imposed. One self-imposed constraint is that it is not our goal
in this analysis to provide and implement a “true” definition of the term “risk” or
“uncertainty.” It is not even clear if such a task is possible. Nor do we include
all possible concepts of risk within our larger analysis, although we do try to pro-
vide some glimpses of how this analysis might fit into a broader decision-making
framework. As will become apparent, this report remains very firmly within a tech-
nical perspective and does not deal with non-technical (for example, psychological
or sociological) perspectives on risk. Our intention is not to propose a canonical
definition that fits any situation. Rather, we seek simply to clarify how we have
used these terms and to show how a slightly broader conception allows integration
across different technical (hydraulic and financial) disciplines. This type of inte-
gration, in turn, allows meaningful comparisons of very different flood mitigation
alternatives to be produced. External constraints on the availability of resources
and data during the study also restrict the usefulness of this analysis as a direct
input into policy decisions on flooding for the city of Vienna. The study was not
commissioned to provide input of this kind. This report is a case study that illus-
trates an approach to catastrophe modeling that relies on real data and addresses a
real problem. Although every effort was made to use high-quality data, to produce
accurate models, and to deal with issues of relevance to policymakers, the study
lacks several of the elements critical to a decision support study. Quality assurance
and quality control (QA/QC) reviews of data and codes were not undertaken; nor
was there a review of the legal and regulatory requirements for a decision. These
aspects often impose significant legal and scheduling constraints on the analyst
and, together with the budgetary and time constraints typical of applied analyses,
impede exploration of alternative approaches to the structuring and evaluation of
problems. It is our hope, however, that the study raises some interesting questions
and suggests possible courses of action in similar situations occurring elsewhere.
We are grateful for the opportunity to explore an applied problem in the way that
seemed most appropriate from the intellectual perspective and to have the freedom
3to address issues and make decisions rather than be forced by external constraints
to follow predefined approaches.
1.1 Concepts of Risk
In his risk taxonomy, Ortwin Renn (1992) distinguishes four perspectives: tech-
nical, economic, psychological, and sociological. As previously mentioned, the
scope of this study is largely within the technical perspective. Renn subdivides
the technical perspective into a statistical or actuarial approach (typically used in
the insurance community), a modeling approach (typically used in the health and
environmental protection community), and probabilistic models (typically used in
safety engineering). One goal of this study is to integrate these distinct approaches
within the technical perspective.
According to Covello and Merkhofer (1994, p. 20), “risk is, at a minimum, a
two-dimensional concept involving: 1) the possibility of an adverse outcome; and
2) uncertainty over the occurrence, timing, or magnitude of that adverse outcome.”
This definition is appropriate for our purposes, as it offers fruitful opportunities for
integrating the differing technical perspectives. Although it is largely consistent
with the concept of risk used in the financial community, there are differences. Fi-
nancial experts, going back to the definition provided by Frank Knight (1921), use
the term “risk” to refer to a measurable (typically statistical) volatility and speak
of “upside” and “downside” risks to refer to the possibility that an outcome may
be either better or worse than the expected outcome. The differences are subtle
but significant. The financial definition is narrower in that Knight’s concept of
risk explicitly excludes epistemic uncertainty and includes only variability (often
called aleatory uncertainty). However, this concept is also broader in the sense that
the possibility of unexpected positive outcomes is also included. The distinction
is relevant to the extent that a policy oriented toward “loss prevention” or “loss re-
duction” can sometimes blind one to the possibilities that may exist for maximizing
welfare.1 The common theme is that both concepts of risk arising within the techni-
cal perspective include, either implicitly or explicitly, probability and consequences
of occurrence as the two major risk components. Our goal is to implement a con-
cept of risk that not only includes the probability/consequence distinction and the
(implicit) full conception of uncertainty advocated by Covello and Merkhofer, but
also broadens consequences to include both upside and downside risks. We empha-
size that the psychological dimensions, such as the aversion that individuals might
1According to White et al. (2001), “there are very few efforts to estimate the net benefits of
location of land use in hazard areas of the actual benefits of extreme events. . . . Land and locations
in areas subject to hazard have market value, often high market value. . . some effort to calculate net
gains and losses should be undertaken in the literature and its continuing absence in these texts reveals
a prevailing state of ignorance that the research efforts have scarcely addressed.”
4have for certain types of risk, or the sociological aspects, such as the equitable dis-
tribution of risks, are not typically considered in technical risk analyses. For this
reason, technical analyses are only one input into larger policy processes. Experi-
ence has also demonstrated the many dimensions to risks that are not included in
estimates of probability and consequence, such as whether the risk is voluntary or
controllable.
Technical disciplines concerned with standard setting have often emphasized
one of the two component concepts of risk at the expense of the other. Some
disciplines have focused most of their attention on probability of occurrence as
a measure of risk. A scenario to be avoided is identified (e.g., destructive flooding,
release of radioactivity from a nuclear reactor, etc.) and the “risk” is the probabil-
ity of occurrence of the adverse event. Typical examples of this paradigm include
traditional approaches to flood and earthquake protection. In traditional flood pro-
tection, for example, a typical goal is to reduce the probability of flooding to below
a certain design value, such as a 100-year flood (i.e., the probability of flooding
in any year should be less than 1 percent). Other disciplines have focused on the
magnitude of the adverse consequences as a measure of risk, most frequently by at-
tempting to keep consequences below a certain level determined to be “acceptable”
or “safe,” regardless of the likelihood of the effect. This approach is embodied,
for example, in regulations banning substances found to be carcinogenic. Setting
exposure levels to hazardous chemicals in the workplace or environment such that
no adverse effects are expected, but without explicit regard as to the likelihood of
that exposure, is an example of this paradigm. This reasoning, especially when the
consequences may be very serious or catastrophic and the probabilities are difficult
to assess, is the logic underlying the European Union’s precautionary principle.
Within the actuarial community, on the other hand, both probabilities and conse-
quences are considered explicitly. However, they are typically telescoped together
by the use of “expected value” as a measure of risk.
1.2 Aleatory Uncertainty, Epistemic Uncertainty, and
Risk Curves
Uncertainty in the likelihood of floods arises from a number of sources. These un-
certainties can be grouped into two fundamental types: aleatory and epistemic.
Aleatory uncertainty, sometimes called irreducible uncertainty, arises from the
natural variability of the system under study. Some systems are fundamentally
stochastic in nature and their future state cannot be predicted deterministically.
There are many examples of this in nature, such as the number of radioactive decay
events observed within a specific time frame from a specific quantity of material or
the time between earthquakes of a given magnitude on a particular fault. For our
5study, the natural variability is the time expected until a storm of a certain mag-
nitude occurs.2 Rainfall patterns are not identical from year to year. This type of
uncertainty is termed “irreducible” uncertainty because it is a property of the phe-
nomenon itself. However, although the maximum rainfall cannot be predicted with
precision, it has been found that these values follow regular statistical distributions.
The likelihood that the worst storm in a year will exceed a certain level may, to a
first approximation, be estimated simply by collecting information every year on
the worst storm (e.g., the amount of rain falling within a 6-hour period) and de-
veloping an empirical distribution. The functional form of the distribution can be
determined based on statistical principles or assigned based upon engineering judg-
ment. The statistical problem is then to use the historical data to find the parameters
of the distribution.
This example also illustrates the second source of uncertainty, namely, epis-
temic uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainty refers to a lack of knowledge about the
system and can be introduced by errors in, or limitations to, the ability to collect
samples. In many locations, reliable historical records may only cover a period
of several decades. Even if it were reliable, measuring peak rainfall or river flow
during a storm is subject to error. There is also no guarantee that the climatic condi-
tions that generate the rainfall or land use patterns affecting the rate at which water
drains into the river have not changed over the period of measurement; in fact, it
is quite likely that such conditions have changed. Finally, the choice of a model to
describe the variability distribution is not a clear-cut process. Fitting observed data
to an incorrect model can lead to errors in prediction. These and other sources of
error lead to epistemic uncertainty. Such uncertainty may not be severe when one
is trying to estimate the expected annual maximum or the maximum to be expected
once every 5–10 years. However, the uncertainty involved in estimating the magni-
tude of storms that recur over a period of centuries or of millennia is dramatically
greater than estimating the magnitude of storms that recur over a period of years or
decades. Although such uncertainties are also present in evaluating the magnitude
of storms that recur over shorter periods, the range of possible values may not be
terribly large. Extrapolation from short observation periods to very long observa-
tion periods amplifies the sources of uncertainties and progressively violates the
assumptions of an underlying steady state made in developing the forecasts. The
range of possible values of peak rainfall during a decadal storm (a storm that is
expected to occur once every decade) may vary only over a few tens of millimeters
2The magnitude or severity of a rainstorm is often defined as the amount of rainfall averaged
over a specific period of time. As rainfall is a stochastic process, the averaging time affects the peak
rainfall. For example, a storm may produce bursts of rain at 100 mm/hr for periods of a few minutes,
but will produce only 50 mm/hr when averaged over a period of three hours. In this study, we will
use the 6-hour average rainfall as the indicator of the magnitude of a storm, as it is this period that
corresponds to the response time of the watershed under study.
6and may be managed by simply adding an appropriate design margin on to an en-
gineered design. In the United States, the use of a safety margin on levee heights
of three feet (approximately 1 m) was just such a consideration (National Research
Council, 2000). However, when attempting to protect against storms that recur over
periods of millennia, the peak rainfalls that might be reasonably expected can range
over tens to hundreds of millimeters. The worst flood in a millennium may be only
slightly more severe than the worst flood in a century, or it could be dramatically
worse. If one applies the typical design margin or safety factor approach, one could
end up installing a system in which most of the costs are directed at ensuring that
the design margin was sufficiently large. On the other hand, if one simply uses a
“best” estimate (such as an expected value or a most likely value), one might find
that there is a significant probability that the protection system would not function
if the storm were much larger than the best estimate.
However, once effective measures are taken to protect against the more frequent
floods, it is precisely the rare and uncertain floods that may now pose most of the
risk to the affected populations. The decision maker is therefore in a quandary,
with pitfalls on all sides. If the true likelihood of a particularly severe flood is quite
high and no mitigation efforts are undertaken, massive damage might result. On
the other hand, if the true likelihood is low and expensive mitigation measure are
undertaken, then the resources used to implement the mitigation may have been
lost if the event fails to occur. In the worst of all possible worlds, expensive miti-
gation measures could be implemented but still fail when called upon to withstand
the flood. In this case, losses are incurred both before the disaster (mitigation costs)
and as a result of the disaster (in terms of damage to assets). Thus, in addition to the
costs and benefits of different mitigation measures, the reliability of the mitigation
measures is also a critical input to decision making. Determining the best course of
action in such a case is problematic and depends sensitively on the preferences and
values of the decision maker. When significant uncertainties are present about the
timing or magnitude of the potential loss, it is not possible to simply compare the
costs and benefits of different options. It is the specific goal of this chapter (and,
more generally, of the whole report) to illustrate a way of structuring these uncer-
tainties so that the decision maker can see the results of a decision and the extent to
which the losses and attendant uncertainties change under different decisions.
The approach we have chosen uses a “risk curve” or complementary cumulative
distribution function (CCDF) to characterize the risk. A single CCDF plots the
magnitude of an event on the horizontal axis versus the probability of exceeding
that magnitude on the vertical axis. This technique is widely used in other risk-
analytic activities, most notably in reactor safety studies. This method was used
in the 1975 Reactor Safety Study to illustrate the number of potential deaths from
an accident at a nuclear reactor as a function of the likelihood of their occurrence.
Typically, the plot is log-linear, with the exceedance probability as the ordinate
7(vertical axis) on a logarithmic scale and the consequence plotted as the abscissa
(horizontal axis). The use of a log-linear scale allows a much finer resolution of the
characteristics of low probability events.3 The risk curve is useful in this regard,
as it explicitly represents both the probability and the consequence. For example,
whereas a standard “safety margin” approach cannot distinguish between a system
failure resulting in low damage and one resulting in high damage, a risk curve can.
In contrast to an expected value approach, a risk curve can distinguish between an
event with a low probability of occurrence and severe consequence versus a more
frequent but less severe consequence. In our curves, we will represent the natural
variability or irreducible uncertainty on the ordinate. The epistemic uncertainty is
represented by error bands of any desired confidence level that surround that curve.
1.3 Catastrophe Models as Integrated Assessment Models
The catastrophe models examined and developed within IIASA’s Risk, Modeling
and Society (RMS) project offer a natural setting for applying this expanded con-
ception of risk. Examination of the use of the term “catastrophe model” reveals
that such models have evolved from the broadening of actuarial approaches for
estimating risk to incorporating the modeling and probabilistic approaches of the
other technical risk perspectives. The distinction between catastrophe models and
earlier, public-policy-oriented simulation models is that (as pointed out by Renn,
1992) modeling and probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) approaches have histor-
ically been used for the purposes of standard setting or for improving technological
systems. Catastrophe models differ in that the results are typically used within a
risk-sharing framework such as insurance.
A common element in most catastrophe models is the use of decomposition,4
a staple element in systems-analytic thinking (Raiffa, 1968; Bier et al., 1999). In
catastrophe modeling, decomposition is implemented by the creation of modules or
submodels. Many authors (Walker, 1997; Kozlowski and Mathewson, 1997; Clark,
2002; Boyle, 2002) define three modules: a scientific or hazard module comprising
an event generator and a local intensity calculation, an engineering module for
damage estimation, and an insurance coverage module for insured loss calculation.
Finally, most catastrophe models produce outputs that are distributional. That is,
the results are typically not simply an expected loss but rather a full loss distribution
curve that may or may not follow a particular statistical distribution. Based upon
3The user must simply keep in mind, when comparing two curves on such a plot, that the use of
a logarithmic scale means that equal divisions on the ordinate represent order of magnitude changes.
The intuitive understanding of the relative likelihood for a user accustomed to linear plots may be
biased to exaggerate the likelihood of low-probability events if this is not consciously acknowledged.
4For a thought-provoking discussion of decomposition, see section 6.4 in Bier et al. (1999).
8these observations, we define catastrophe modeling as a risk-analytic technique that
has the four following characteristics:
1) The technique: catastrophe modeling makes use of simulations rather than
purely historical actuarial data for the purposes of estimating probabilities and out-
comes. One of the main reasons for developing a catastrophe model is that there are
not enough historical data for actuarial estimates. Data must therefore be generated
by simulating the physical events. This does not preclude the inclusion of actuarial
data: it is enough that simulations based on theoretical models rather than statistical
analysis of historical data be included as a primary element of the analysis.
2) The structure: catastrophe models are typically modular, that is, comprised
of relatively independent submodels. For example, a “hazard” submodel drives
the risk, a “loss” submodel estimates some type of loss dependent upon the haz-
ard, and a “management” submodel examines the impact of different decisions.
The modular nature of most catastrophe models is important in that it allows (a)
the development of a model by interdisciplinary teams and (b) where appropriate,
the substitution of a simple and computationally inexpensive reduced-form model
for a more complex and computationally time-consuming mechanistic simulation
model. The ability of the model to be developed by interdisciplinary teams allows
the inclusion of the relevant expertise without requiring all members of the team
to be experts in all the disciplines represented in the model. The important ele-
ment is that all members of the team should have an understanding not only of
how to properly interpret the output of the submodels but also of the ultimate use
of the model. The ability to implement computationally inexpensive reduced-form
models—referred to as “catastrophe generators” by Ermoliev et al. (2000)—allows
for the use of numerical optimization models that would be analytically intractable
and otherwise prohibitively expensive in computational resources.
3) The output: catastrophe models explicitly include both probabilities and con-
sequences (typically, purely financial consequences rather than health and safety
or broader economic consequences). In contrast to many deterministic models or
probabilistic safety assessments, the catastrophe model does not focus solely on
the probability of failure (e.g., the reliability of a system). In contrast to many ac-
tuarial methods, it does not collapse the probability and consequence into a single
expected value but focuses attention on the entire combination of probabilities and
consequences, namely, the probability distribution of consequences.
4) The use: the main difference between a catastrophe model and a more tra-
ditional natural hazard risk assessment as applied in public policy analysis is the
application. Catastrophe (cat) models have thus mainly been developed for insur-
ance or risk sharing settings. This contrasts with flood damage reduction analyses,
which are often focused on loss prevention or loss reduction. Like the public pol-
icy models for natural hazard risk assessment described by Petak and Atkisson
9(1982), cat models are typically modular simulation models producing a probabil-
ity distribution of potential losses. The first two elements (a scientific or hazard
module comprising an event generator and a local intensity calculation, as well
as an engineering module for damage estimation) are essentially the same as the
first two modules of the public-policy-oriented models discussed previously. How-
ever, a catastrophe model typically extends the public-policy-model approach by
overlaying the exposure of the insurer over the distribution of damages to compute
potential claims. In a rather novel application, a catastrophe model developed by
IIASA for flooding on the Upper Tisza River in Hungary was used to illustrate the
policy impacts of options for a nationwide insurance program. This proved use-
ful at a stakeholder workshop, where local residents, insurance companies, and the
central government reached a consensus on a policy direction (see Vari et al., 2003;
Linnerooth-Bayer and Vari, 2004; Ekenberg et al., 2003).
1.4 Catastrophe Modeling and Uncertainty
Catastrophic risks are low-probability, high-consequences events. Often stemming
from low probability, they are plagued by major uncertainties. One less-developed
aspect of catastrophe modeling is accounting for epistemic uncertainty. Although
many catastrophe models are probabilistic, they often include only aleatory uncer-
tainty, perhaps reflecting the origin of these approaches within the insurance com-
munity. However, an explicit consideration of epistemic uncertainty is critically im-
portant. Physically based simulation of climate-driven catastrophes is challenging
(Petak and Atkisson, 1982; Minnery and Smith, 1996), as no models are yet avail-
able that can synthesize accurate predictions of rainfalls, wind speeds, or other cli-
matic phenomena with detailed resolution across the full range of spatial–temporal
scales necessary for accurate risk analyses (e.g., from global scale to scales of the
order of square kilometers and from annual to hourly scales). When the possibility
of climate change is taken into account, the epistemic uncertainties increase dra-
matically. Petak and Atkisson (1982, p. 186) emphasize that “the results derived
from the risk analysis models are not to be considered ‘fact.’ Much uncertainty
is associated with the findings generated by the models.” This statement remains
as true today as when it was written 20 years ago. Pervasive uncertainties in the
underlying science remain. In financial circles, this uncertainty is termed “ambigu-
ity,” and a high level of ambiguity is a stumbling block to the success of insurance
programs because of the effect it has on insurability (Kunreuther and Roth, 1998,
p. 33). One sometimes hears that uncertainty can be reduced by modeling. It is im-
portant to recognize that this is not always the case. There is a significant difference
between using a model for prediction and using a model for information structur-
ing. Using a model for pricing insurance can be difficult because it may force the
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model to be used in predictive mode, where the model may be weak. Models do
not necessarily reveal anything new about the world. What they are good at doing
is structuring the information that is already available, allowing additional relevant
information to be brought to bear on a problem. They may not be able to reduce
uncertainty, though, and in fact they may reveal just how uncertain a situation is.
The good news is that there is long experience in risk analysis techniques for
dealing with uncertainty and that this experience is being brought in to the field
of catastrophe modeling. Considerable progress has been made in methods for the
explicit analysis of uncertainty (cf. Morgan and Henrion, 1990; National Research
Council, 2000; Bier et al., 1999; and others). Model verification and validation
exercises can be conducted to assist in the quantification of uncertainties in catas-
trophe models. Furthermore, multiple assessments can be carried out. According
to Gary Venter (2003) Guy Carpenter stated that a “key to effective catastrophe
modeling is understanding the uncertainties involved. . . it is critical to look at the
results from a number of catastrophe models so that we can see what the range
of results would be and how different approaches to a problem could lead to dif-
ferent outcomes.” The integrated approach presented in this report draws heavily
upon one of the authors’ experience with the treatment of uncertainty in the field
of human health risks from pollutants introduced into the environment as well as
from approaches developed for characterizing uncertainty in nuclear power plant
risk assessments (cf. Morgan and Henrion, 1990; Covello and Merkhofer, 1993).
We are heartened to see that others are beginning to explore this topic as well; for
an example of an approach similar to ours that examined the uncertainty in flood
risks along the River Rhine, see Merz et al. (2002).
1.5 Motivation for Catastrophe Modeling
Given the potential costs and uncertainties associated with catastrophe modeling,
what are the advantages? They are considerable. At a minimum, the use of a distri-
butional technique allows a much better characterization of loss possibilities than
that embodied in the annual expected loss or the probable maximum loss concept.
However, Walker (1997) suggests that the true advantage of catastrophe model-
ing “lies in the step change described above in the information it provides, not the
marginal improvement in a single point calculation. . . the benefits lie in the overall
savings arising from an integrated approach to risk management.” A major advan-
tage of these types of integrated models (whether cat models for insurance purposes
or public policy models commissioned by national or regional governments) is that
they can produce outputs tailored to different stakeholders and multiple hazards
simultaneously. “The primary output. . . may be the loss experienced by a single
property or facility (single-site analysis), the aggregate portfolio loss in a particular
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catastrophe zone (zone analysis), or the aggregate portfolio loss for a whole state
or country, or worldwide, from a particular hazard (specific hazard analysis) or all
hazards (multi-hazard analysis)” (Walker, 1997). The outputs from an integrated
model of climate risk and seismic risk, for example, could show the distribution
of impacts to farmers (both the distribution and across the whole sector), to ur-
ban dwellers, to insurers, and to the government treasuries. These distributions of
impacts might be the basis for either negotiation or optimization, or both.
To realize these advantages, it is necessary to provide guidance, tools, and prac-
tical examples for the effective use of the new information within a risk-sharing
context. This has been explored by Ermoliev et al. (2000) for the case of insurers,
illustrating how catastrophe modeling can lead to improved policies on the part of
insurers of their coverage of losses and premiums in an environment of spatial and
temporal dependencies. By improved policies, the authors suggest some reasonable
objectives on the part of insurers (profits, stability) and premium holders. Further-
more, in contrast to models that are focused on loss prevention or loss reduction, the
risk-sharing orientation of catastrophe models leads naturally to their applicability
to negotiation processes. The ability of a model to clarify the results of a particular
decision on the distribution of risks and benefits or to reveal potential unintended
consequences allows parties to a negotiation to examine how different policies and
decisions might affect their own interests. The IIASA River Tisza study (see Vari et
al., 2003; Ekenberg et al., 2003) examined the use of a catastrophe model in the ne-
gotiations between stakeholders (including citizens, local and national government
officials, engineers, and insurers) dealing with flood risks on the Tisza River. The
use of catastrophe models to examine the concrete impacts of different concepts
of fairness as a tool in negotiations on risk may prove to be one of the more novel
applications of the technique.
1.6 Objectives and Structure of the Report
This report applies these concepts of risk and uncertainty to a concrete case,
namely, the risk of flooding along the Vienna River in Vienna, Austria. Our goal
is to illustrate how the techniques discussed above can be applied to the problems
of urban flooding. It thereby extends traditional engineering-based approaches to
flood risk management, effectively integrating loss-spreading techniques, such as
the purchase of flood insurance or the maintenance of a catastrophe fund, with tra-
ditional loss-reduction techniques, such as the construction of levees, floodwalls,
or detention basins. Furthermore, by representing risk using a CCDF (Comple-
mentary Cumulative Distribution Function or “risk curve”), we illustrate: 1) an
information-rich approach to dealing simultaneously with probabilities and con-
sequences; and 2) the significant differences between policy alternatives. Finally,
12
we illustrate how Monte Carlo simulation techniques can be used to address both
epistemic and aleatory uncertainty.
The remainder of this report therefore focuses on the elaboration of a catastro-
phe model for management of flood risks on the Vienna River that fully addresses
the range of uncertainties in possible financial losses. We begin with a discussion
of the potential problems associated with flooding along the Vienna River and iden-
tify flooding of a subway line as the major area at risk. We then briefly examine
case studies of previous catastrophic subway floods and use these to develop an
empirical model for the estimation of damages from flooding. This model is then
integrated with the hydraulic analyses prepared by BOKU/IWHW (Institute of Wa-
ter Management, Hydrology, and Hydraulic Engineering) to provide an integrated
catastrophe model. Following this, the model is used to evaluate a number of dif-
ferent hypothetical mitigation options, both structural and financial, for managing
flood risks. Emphasis is placed on the ability to quantitatively compare the re-
sults of different options with the results of options integrating both structural and
non-structural measures. Both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties are handled ex-
plicitly throughout. The report concludes with a discussion of the insights provided
by this exercise.
2
Background
The following discussion is summarized from Faber and Nachtnebel (2003), where
technical details of the data and models can be found.
2.1 General Description
The Vienna River is one of the largest rivers in the city of Vienna with a catchment
area of 230 km2. As shown in Figure 2.1, the river flows through some of the most
densely populated districts of the city. The most exposed infrastructure is located
along a reach of over 8 km, namely, the subway line, which is constructed in an
open section on the right river bank, and the main roads on both sides. From a
hydrological viewpoint, flood hazards from the Vienna River are critical because
of the large number of impervious surfaces covering wide parts of the catchment,
low geological infiltration capacity, and little natural retention. These lead to rapid
rises in water level, resulting in flash flooding.
The 12 km urban reach is currently a stone-work and concrete bed with tun-
neled river reaches. This system was constructed between 1895 and 1915 in paral-
lel with the construction of the city railway. Two sections of 0.375 and 2.156 km
were tunneled. The flood-related threat in the city is due to many factors, including
large channel slopes and flow velocities, rapid increase of discharge, and the ab-
sence of natural retention areas. According to hydraulics estimates and laboratory
tests, velocities up to 7–8 m/s and supercritical flow conditions in several sections
are expected during extreme floods. Significant backwaters from arch bridges and
tunneled sections, lateral waves of +/–0.75 m at 5.5–6.5 m/s mean velocity, as well
as transverse water surface inclination in bends are expected to occur during large
floods.
2.2 Rainfall Characteristics
As in many small mid-latitude catchments, flooding on the Vienna River is typi-
cally flash flooding due to small and meso-scale convective storms embedded in
large-scale systems. The duration of these storms is typically from several hours to
one day, and flooding is generated because of the fast watershed responses. Even
low hills and mountains can intensify storm events in comparison with plain areas
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Kennedybrücke Gauge
Halterbach Node
Figure 2.1. Vienna River watershed map.
Source: ¨OK 200, BEV (1999).
The Vienna River watershed map shows the watershed with its rural (173 km2)
and urban character (57 km2); the Halterbach Node which is the outlet of the ru-
ral catchment for rainfall runoff modeling the flood retention reservoirs: Auhof,
Mauerbach, and Wienerwaldsee; and the Kennedybru¨cke (Kennedy Bridge) gauge
in the urban river reach.
through the regeneration of convective cells (Kelsch, 2001). The orographically in-
tensified convective movement of air masses in the western hills of the Vienna River
basin is also documented in the Austrian Hydrographical Atlas (HA ¨O, 2003).
As discussed in the Introduction, flood protection tends to rely on the identifica-
tion of a design flood or design rainfall with a specified annual exceedance proba-
bility.1 Applications of design rainfall data in flood protection and urban hydrology
often use rain yield or rain depth relations. Intensity-depth-frequency (IDF) curves
are developed for specified regions through fitting mostly exponential functions to
recorded rainfall aggregates of partial series. Modeling of very rare storms uses
design values developed from local records or regionalized data. These numbers
represent conservative estimates of expected values; the parametrical uncertainty is
1A simple way to determine the annual exceedance probability is to count the number of years
in which the flood exceeded a certain level and divide that by the total number of observations. In
other words, a flood with an annual exceedance probability of 10 percent is a flood magnitude that
is equaled or exceeded in one out of every 10 years of observation. It may then be referred to as the
“10-year” flood.
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Figure 2.2. Comparison of 6-hour point design rainfall in the rural Vienna River
catchment.
Note: Wien River = Vienna River
currently ignored in design and analysis of rainfall-runoff processes. A temporal
change of design values can be seen from the one-hour rainfall at Vienna’s oldest
meteorological station Hohe Warte, which increased steadily from 1957 to 2000
(Figure 2.2). The relative extent to which climate change, measurement errors,
data processing, and extrapolation uncertainties have contributed to this increase
is unclear. According to the Vienna hydrographical service (Pekarek, 1998), the
precipitation characteristics and recording and analyzing methods have changed in
recent years so that return periods cannot currently be assigned to recently mon-
itored extreme storms. A re-evaluation of the Schimpf criteria and design data,
which have been widely used in Austria since the early 1970s, is recommended
by that author. These criteria would imply that the 48-hour rain depth of 240 mm
measured in the hills west of the city in July 1997 exceeded a 1,000-year event.
There are also concerns about the accuracy of the extrapolation of the Lower Aus-
trian 1901–1980 series (Lower Austria, 1985). This concern has led to efforts to
establish new design rainfall data for Lower Austria by combining atmospheric
models and measurements (Salzer, 2002). In the discussion of design values, atten-
tion should be paid to the length of the underlying series, the date of establishment
(state-of-the-art methodology), and if measurement errors were corrected, for ex-
ample, by increasing the raw data by a certain amount. Design values for the greater
region around the Vienna River basin have been published by a number of authors,
mainly for and from Hohe Warte data. They are now given. However, for reasons
of completeness, publications which are not directly relevant to this investigation
are also listed.
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Steinhauser (1957): Data from the 1901–1955 series were obtained by the Hell-
mann recorder, selected according to thresholds of half of the Wussow criterion and
processed with the Reinhold guidelines (Wussow, 1922; Reinhold, 1935). Amounts
for rainfall durations from 5 minutes to 48 hours are given with a maximum return
period of 50 years for Hohe Warte.
Schimpf (1970): Values are published for rainfall durations from 30 minutes
to 72 hours. For shorter intervals, the Wussow formula is recommended. The
regional classification of Kreps and Schimpf (1965) assigns the K35 criterion to
the western Vienna area and the Vienna River catchment and the K25 criterion
to urban plains and the region with moderate hills. The accuracy of these design
values is questionable.
Lower Austrian Government (Lower Austria, 1985): This publication uses the
1901–1980 series and recommends design values up to 48 hours and a exceedance
probability of 0.01 for different zones. The western Vienna hills and the Vienna
River catchment are located in the region of 50–60 mm mean extreme daily pre-
cipitation, whereas the urban areas are in the 40–50 mm zone. This database is no
longer recommended, as the values seem too small (Salzer, 2002). It is assumed by
experts that an increase of 20–40 percent leads to more accurate values.
Auer et al. (1989): Intensity-duration-frequency (IDF) relations are developed
for Hohe Warte from 5-minute ombrograph aggregates of the partial series spanning
1973–1982, according to DVWK-ATV (1983). From the 10-year series up to 50-
year values were extrapolated for rain durations from 5 minutes to 30 days.
Kadrnoska and Adam (1992): Design recommendations for conduits in Vienna
are based on a maximum annual 15-minute rainfall intensity with 105 l/s/ha south-
west of the River Danube and 90 l/s/ha northeast. These values are developed from
the 1901–1955 series (Steinhauser, 1957). Other rain durations and return periods
are usually obtained by using the Reinhold (1935 and 1940) coefficients. Rein-
hold’s time coefficients are applicable for return periods up to 20 years. They are
normally used as simplified pipe design tools.
Lorenz and Skoda (2000): Design rainfall is calculated by the OKM (Oro-
graphic Convective Model); Lorenz and Skoda, 2000; HA ¨O, 2003) using partial
series of the ¨OKOSTRA project (for the city of Vienna, only the Hohe Warte series
is long enough) and a meteorological prediction model for convective storms with
orographic influence. Lorenz and Skoda corrected the measurement error by a 5
percent increase in raw data. The orographic influence is accounted for by incorpo-
rating a 1.5 km raster elevation model. Durations range from 5 minutes to 12 hours
and return periods from 0.5 to 100 years. The authors recommend two formulas
for return periods longer than 100 years and a re-evaluation of their results when
improved convective models and a larger rainfall database are available. Electronic
data were obtained from HZB via MA 45. These model data are available for the
whole of Austria and are presently recommended in Lower Austria for durations
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of up to 3 hours and return periods of up to 100 years. Values for other durations
and return periods have been re-evaluated (Salzer, 2002). These numbers are also
published in the digital Austrian Hydrologic Atlas (HA ¨O, 2003). Data represent
the lower limits of maximum convective precipitation inside a 6 x 6 km area.
Lower Austrian Government (Lower Austria, 2001): A review of the Lower
Austria rainfall intensities for the one-year 15-minute storm was published in 2000.
It shows values from 110 to 120 l/s/ha around the city and up to 130 l/s/ha in the
Vienna River basin (Lower Austria, 2000).
¨OKLIM (2001): This database comprises extrapolated rain data of several du-
rations of the 1991–1999 series of Hohe Warte.
The increase in the design values over time based on observations is evident
when one compares Steinhauser (1957), Auer (1989), and ¨OKLIM (2001). Higher
values due to a different model approach are obtained by Lorenz and Skoda (2002).
High values of the Lower Austrian series (1980) and Schimpf’s data (1970) are ex-
plained by the geographical location of Hohe Warte on the boundary of two regions.
The curves represent the higher precipitation class. This underlines the importance
of spatial variability.
To establish the design rainfall amounts for flood investigations in the Vienna
River basin and protection reservoir adaptation, an extrapolation from the Lower
Austria series (1901–1980) and Schimpf’s data was performed by Neukirchen
(1995), as indicated in Figure 2.2. Both these analyses were reassessed, and it
was concluded that the storm depths had been underestimated. Figure 2.2 com-
prises the 30 percent increased values from the 1901–1980 Lower Austria series. It
also shows the values proposed by Lorenz and Skoda (2000) for the urban Vienna
River catchment consisting of a curve for return periods up to 100 years and two
equations for larger values. Because of the orographic influence, the numbers for
the rural Vienna River basin (which are not available) could be even larger, but they
are currently re-evaluated for annual probabilities smaller than 0.01 and durations
of more than 3 hours.
For this study, it is assumed that reliable values fall between the design val-
ues and the Lorenz and Skoda figures; however, there remains a considerable un-
certainty concerning the design rainfall depth. This uncertainty is expressed by
defining the design storm depth as a random variable following an extreme value
distribution and by explicitly considering a normal distributed standard error about
the parameters of that distribution.
As rainfall of a larger areal extension has a smaller intensity than a point rainfall
of a given frequency, the design rainfall data have to be reduced to obtain estimates
for the basin precipitation. For the rural (173 km2) and the entire Vienna River
catchment (230 km2), areal reduction factors of 95–80 percent are found in Maniak
(1988), Gutknecht (1982), and Lorenz and Skoda (2000). As this reduction applies
to all point rainfall design values in the same way, it is not used in the project.
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Table 2.1. Estimates of peak discharges during significant floods at the
Kennedybru¨cke gauge, Km 7.65.
Peak discharge Return period
(m3/s) (a) Date Reference
472 70 April 1951 Bauer (1993)
374 30–35 July 1975 Bauer (1993)
138 20–25 May 1991 Bauer (1993)
317 7 July 1997 Neukirchen (1997), according to rating curve
285 < 50 7 July 1997 Neukirchen (1997), adjusted
193 7 July 1997 HZB (1999)
125 21 May 1999 HZB (1999)
Figure 2.3. Vienna River at Km 8 during normal flow conditions (left) and during
the 1975 flood (right).
Source: BMLFUW (2002).
The Vienna River has a mean annual flow, based on data from 1981 to 1999,
of 1.16 m3/s (HZB, 1999). The maximum discharge was estimated for the 18
May 1851 event as 600 m3/s at the outlet of the Vienna River into the Danube
(Bauer, 1993). Some of the larger events in the 20th century were estimated at the
Kennedybru¨cke gauge at Km 7.65. Water surfaces have been recorded since 1904
and discharges since 1981. The Vienna River has experienced extremely large flows
in the past, as illustrated in Table 2.1 and Figure 2.3.
However, problems related to the estimation of the probability of larger dis-
charges include undocumented changes in gauge zero before 1958, gradually vary-
ing flow conditions, and hydraulic jumps (MA 45, 2001a). Data from 1962 to 1971
are missing. As the available gauge series are not very long or reliable, rainfall-
runoff models are used for design and analysis purposes. For the recent upgrades
of the Vienna River flood protection system, which started in 1997, catchment
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models were developed that account for rainfall-runoff, routing, and storage pro-
cesses. These models provide flood hydrographs entering the urban river reach.
The urban stormwater runoff is estimated and added along the river. It is assumed
that the recurrence periods of rainfall and discharge are equal. Catchment models
were established by Neukirchen (1985) with a simplified estimation of flood control
basin performance, IWHW (1988) included a hydrologic retention basin model and
Neukirchen (1995) established a rainfall-runoff model as a basis for the projected
real-time control system. This model was calibrated by two flood events in 1991.
The largest peak discharge and volume at the city’s entrance were calculated for
the 6-hour storm. The urban runoff contribution is calculated with a rainfall-runoff
and hydrodynamic transport model (data, for example, in Neukirchen, 2000).
2.3 Elements at Risk
Several elements at risk (EAR) are located in the urban river vicinity. The most
endangered is the U4 subway line on the right embankment. For 7.5 km it is situ-
ated mostly in open sections beside the river before it enters the underground track
(Figure 2.4). A partition wall protects the subway line from floods. Portable flood
barriers can be installed in two locations to prevent the overflowing water from
being conveyed to underground sections of the line, which include major subway
junctions. These emergency measures are now available; they require a 6-hour
lead time for installation. There are main roads on the left embankment, together
with densely populated areas. Various service pipes are located under the road
embankments.
The construction of the first city railway along the Vienna River was started in
1894 and opened to the public in 1898. It was closed down in 1918 and reopened as
an electric line in 1926. The gradual reconstruction to become the transport system
of today was begun in 1976 and completed in 1981 (Prillinger, 2000). There are a
variety of failure mechanisms that could lead to severe damage to the subway. The
term “overflowing” is used for a situation where the mean water level is higher than
the wall crest. This contrasts with “wave overtopping,” which refers to the temporal
and spatial oscillations of the water surface over the floodwall. Although no past
inundation or other flood damage to the subway or the embankment has been re-
ported, it is generally agreed that wave overtopping and overflowing of the subway
wall may occur at floods slightly larger than a 100-year event. In the event of in-
tensive overflowing and the absence or malfunction of the transverse portable flood
barriers located at the track at La¨ngenfeldgasse (upgraded 2001) and Naschmarkt
(since 1999), the U4 subway line acts as a flood bypass conveying water down-
stream to the junctions at La¨ngenfeldgasse, Karlsplatz, and Landstrasse where the
tunnels of nearly all connected lines are inundated (see the three crossed circles on
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Figure 2.4a. Vienna River.
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Figure 2.4b. Elements at risk.
Figure 2.4. General situation of the urban Vienna River with the main elements at
risk. Map: BEV, ¨OK50.
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the map in Figure 2.4a). In addition, about 1 km downstream of the Auhof basins,
local inundation of both embankment roads may occur.
Another failure mechanism is wall collapse. The subway’s masonry partition
wall was constructed about 100 years ago and subsequently restored. During floods,
it is subjected to hydrostatic and dynamic horizontal water forces and also, in par-
ticularly adverse conditions, to pore water pressure acting in the wall joints and
fissures. Considering the wall geometry of the bends in plan view, the strength also
depends on the arch action: concave bends have a slightly higher resistance. Large
horizontal forces appear only with extreme water levels, and the loss of equilib-
rium may cause rapid overflowing. A final failure mechanism is the collapse of the
embankment wall on either the left or right bank. The stability of the embankment
wall depends on intact subsoil supporting the concrete foundation, which may be
affected by the development of large scours close to the foundations. This can hap-
pen after the invert material is destroyed by the stream’s shear force. It is assumed
that intensive foundation scouring results in wall failure, leading to severe damage
on the left embankment, in consequence of which the conveying capacity will be
reduced by wall and backfill material. The backwater effects will increase the prob-
ability of the above-mentioned failure modes. If they occur on the right bank, rapid
overflowing into the subway line and stations could occur.
2.4 Flood Protection
Because of the problems discussed above, and because of the desire for the river to
have an improved ecological and recreational character, a suite of flood protection
activities has been identified. An interdisciplinary study (Bauer, 1993) combined
ecological and technical issues to produce a solution that focuses on reconstructing,
extending, and adaptively controlling the flood protection works. To improve the
flood-carrying capacity of the channelized river and to improve water quality, the
study further proposes a large urban stormwater bypass channel below the current
river bed. Urban stormwater discharges can reach up to 200 m3/s at the mouth of the
Vienna River in extreme cases (Bauer, 1993; MA 45, 1996). The goal of this project
is to reduce the 1,000-year design flood of the rural river basin from its original (pre-
1990) value of 475 m3/s to 380 m3/s. All the urban stormwater will be conveyed in a
bypass channel located in the current river bed. In addition, a forecast-based runoff
model for reservoir control will be installed and the retention schemes (Figure 2.5)
will be adapted. The Mauerbach and Auhof schemes have been rehabilitated to
serve ecological and recreational purposes in addition to their flood-protection role.
The redesign of the reservoirs was based on hydrologic simulations with a rainfall-
runoff model that was calibrated by the May and August 1991 storms. Future work
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Figure 2.5. Auhof and Mauerbach retention schemes (MA 45, 1996).
will focus on rainfall forecasting for the real-time-controlled basin operation and
the implementation of a warning and basin operation system.
The flood protection system in the Vienna River basin is characterized by a
sequence of partly upgraded detention reservoirs and a 12 km channelized urban
reach. Both the flood control basins and the urban river reaches were engineered
from 1895 to 1902. Apart from repairs undertaken over the last century, the urban
river is mainly in the form in which it was constructed in 1900. According to a
critical analysis in the 1980s, the retention basin provided insufficient protection, as
very large hydrograph peaks such as the 100- and 1,000-year events pass through
the flood control basins without significant reduction of the flood peak (IWHW,
1988). This is because of insufficient storage volume and control capacity, which
causes premature basin filling of the Auhof reservoirs by tributaries of the adjacent
hills and by the increasing branch of the Vienna River hydrograph.
The Auhof flood storage system consists of an upstream basin distributing the
discharge into the bypass channel or the five-basin storage cascade. During upgrad-
ing works completed in 2001, some of the weir crests were increased in height,
and hydraulic steel structures were upgraded for adaptive control purposes. The
landscape of the basins was redesigned from an ecological viewpoint. The Mauer-
bach basins consist of a distribution basin and one storage basin. Changes similar
to those at Auhof were also carried out at Mauerbach reservoir and completed in
2001.
The Wienerwaldsee is an artificial reservoir with a 13.5 m high barrage con-
structed in 1894 to provide drinking water of up to 24,000 m3 per day at times
of peak demand and in emergencies (Bauer, 1993). Plans have been drawn up to
23
0
600
400
200
0
380
540
635
540
635
635
600
400
200
0
600
400
200
 H
Q
 1
00
0 
(m
3
/s
)
W
ie
ne
rw
al
ds
ee
 
Tu
ln
er
ba
ch
D
am
ba
ch
 
D
eu
ts
ch
w
al
db
ac
h 
G
ab
lit
zb
ac
h 
M
au
er
ba
ch
G
rü
na
ue
r 
B
ac
h
H
al
te
rb
ac
h
Li
nz
er
ba
ch Flowrate at 
immission into 
the Danube 
channel
Without 
new protection
measures
Afer modification 
of the retention 
basin system
After operability
of the bypass 
channel
Vienna River
external zone
Vienna River
city
Auhof
retention basin
Figure 2.6. Hydrological profile of the 1,000-year design peak discharge (MA 45,
1996).
Table 2.2. Projected retention basin storage capacity along the Vienna River.
Retention Basin Flood storage volume (m3)
Neukirchen (1997) Neukirchen (2001)
Auhof 1,160,000 720,000
Mauerbach 160,000 160,000
Wienerwaldsee 520,000 630,000
Total 1,840,000 1,510,000
adapt this basin to serve flood control purposes. These include an extension of the
barrage and an expansion of control capacity. However, as of March 2003 these
works had not been started. One reason is that other drinking water sources were
due to take over its capacity in 2005, and the further utilization of Wienerwaldsee
was thus in question. The options of selling the basin to the adjacent Lower Aus-
tria communities or using the basin purely for flood protection purposes have been
widely discussed (Kurier, 2002).
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The hydrologic investigations in this study distinguish among several construc-
tion and operational states of the retention basin system:
1. Hypothetical natural state without any artificial retention capacity;
2. Reservoir state before beginning of the upgrading works in 1997;
3. Recent (2002) state; and
4. Reservoir state after completed upgrading of Auhof, Mauerbach, and
Wienerwaldsee
The effect of upgrading the protection system from no retention effect to full
operation of all three reservoirs on the 1,000-year design flood peak is demonstrated
in the upper and middle hydrologic profile from Wienerwaldsee to the mouth in
Figure 2.6. The remaining discharge into the Vienna River in m3/s can be decreased
down to 380 m3/s starting from 635 m3/s. The lower profile exhibits the influence
of the urban stormwater bypass channel. A detailed description of structural and
operational basin conditions can be found in Bauer (1993), MA 45 (1996), and
Neukirchen (1995; 1996; 1997). For the projected retention basins see Table 2.2.
3
Hydraulic Assessment Model
Development
The following discussion has been adapted from the discussion in Faber et al.
(2003) and summarizes the work described in much greater detail in Faber and
Nachtnebel (2003), where the technical details of the data and models used can be
found. The objective of the hydrologic and hydraulic analysis was to come up with
an estimate of the frequency of failure of the protection system investigated and to
give an approximation of the severity of a failure event. These are intended as in-
puts to the IIASA catastrophe model. Uncertainties in the input data are processed
by Monte Carlo methods.
3.1 Stochastic Hydraulic Model: Summary Description
To model the watershed hydrology, the rainfall depth sampled for a defined return
period is transferred into a peak discharge by stepwise deterministic relations for
different constructional and operational detention reservoir states. These transfer
functions were derived from rainfall-runoff models for the rural and the urban river
reach (Neukirchen, 1995; 2000). The uncertainty in these models is not included
in the Monte Carlo approach. The estimation of relevant flow parameters was car-
ried out with a modified version of the hydraulic 1-D steady-flow model HEC-RAS
(HEC, 2001). The HEC-RAS code computes water levels by accounting for sub-
and supercritical flow conditions, backwater effects from channel constrictions, and
transverse water surface inclination in bends. The computational kernel of HEC-
RAS was used within a Monte Carlo simulation framework to assess the proba-
bility of failure conditional on user-defined return periods. In addition to the peak
discharge described above, several basic random variables were introduced in the
Monte Carlo simulations to incorporate uncertainties in the channel roughness, the
river cross-section station and elevation, and the energy loss due to bridge con-
strictions. From the output of each hydraulic model run, the occurrence of several
possible flood-induced failure modes was evaluated. These failure types comprise
overflowing, structural damages like tipping of a floodwall, scouring of the river
bed, and collapse of river bank structures. If a deterministic analysis is performed
with expected values, the structural failure modes will not occur. However, the goal
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of this section is to introduce parametric uncertainties that may result in system
failure at river flow rates close to, but not exceeding, the design flow.
The system of equations describing water level as a function of channel pa-
rameters and river flow rate is too complex to propagate uncertainties analyti-
cally. Therefore, Monte Carlo simulations are performed by sampling inputs to the
hydraulic model to provide empirical conditional probabilities of failure P(F|Tr),
given specified return periods Tr = t (e.g., t = 50 or 100 years). A failure curve is
fitted to the data points to obtain a continuous function. The simulated events have
different but well defined return periods which represent the basic inequality for
developing the weighting function of each simulated scenario: the probability of a
variable X being larger than or equal to a defined value x indicated by the return
period Tr = t:
P (X ≥ xt) =
1
τ(x)
(3.1)
As the equality P(X = xt) is usually described by a probability density function,
which is not known, a numerical solution with Dt = 1 year is performed. Equa-
tion 3.2 is used as the weighting function assigned to the conditional probability
described by the failure curve.
P (X = xτ ) = P (Tr = τ) ∼=
1
τ
−
1
τ + 1
=
1
τ(τ + 1)
(3.2)
a) Conditional probability of failure P(F|Tr)
b) Weighting function for conditional probabilities of failure P(Tr = t)
The total probability concept (e.g., in Ang and Tang, 1975; Plate, 1993) is
used for the integration of all conditional probabilities weighted by their occurrence
probability and gives an estimate of the probability that the system fails in one year:
P (F ) =
∞∑
τ=1
P (F |Tr = τ)
1
τ(τ + 1)
(3.3)
For the failure assessment, basic random variables are introduced describing the
water pressure in the floodwall, the critical river bed material’s shear stress, and the
scour depth and center for the failure mechanism. Further, the partly blocked flow
profile due to collapsed bank structures and backfill material is explicitly modeled
by a randomly changed cross-section geometry.
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Figure 3.1. Design values of 6-hour storm depth in Vienna River catchment with
fitted model curves according to Table 3.3: Expectation +/- 2 SE .
Table 3.1. Expected annual 6-hour storm depth.
Lorenz (2002) Schimpf (1970) Lower Austria (1985)
N(Tr = 1a) 32.8 mm 27 mm 28.51 mm
3.2 Stochastic Hydraulic Model—Parameters
3.2.1 Design Storm Depth Parameters
The storm depth is modeled by a Gumbel distribution. The required parameters for
this distribution are the mean value and standard deviation SN . Parameters have
to be estimated from design recommendations; these consist of few N(Tr) points
for the given storm duration, as the underlying record series are not available. The
parameters were estimated by manually fitted curves in Figure 3.1, and through
the discussion regarding the accuracy of design values in the preceding sections.
Table 3.1 gives an orientation for the parameter estimation.
The assumed parameters are Nm = 29.44 mm and SN = 16.74 mm, indicated
by the circle-marked lines in Figure 3.1. The extrapolated values represent ex-
pectations based on potentially erratic data and a limited sample size; therefore a
measure of uncertainty is developed. For a numerical solution, the basic variable
Sx is estimated by E(SN ) in order to express SE . Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1 show the
total scattering and its components.
Table 3.2 exhibits expected values NT r, data scattering SE due to limited sam-
ple size n, and raw data error. It also shows ranges at 95.4 percent confidence inter-
val. For modeling purposes, similar results can be achieved in a simplified way by
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Table 3.2. Estimated parameters and Gumbel statistics.
GUMBEL Estimated parameter Mean Standard dev. Assumption
Mean value Nm (mm) 29.44 Constant
Standard deviation SN (mm) 16.74 3.125 Normal distributed: 95.4% between 10.5 and 23 mm
Sample size n 80 1901–1980 series
Reduced mean value Yη 0.5569
Reduced standard dev. SY η 1.1938 Standard dev. due to
limited data
sample error both
σNm = Nm(SNm) Nm(SNm)
NTr SE(Tr) K(Tr)σmN (SE2+ +2σNm -2 σNm
PM = 1-1/Tr Tr(a) YTr K (mm) (mm) (mm) (K σnM )2)1/2 (mm) (mm)
0.5 2 0.3665 –0.1595 26.77 1.7 –0.5 1.79 30.36 23.18
0.8 5 1.4999 0.7899 42.67 3.0 2.5 3.89 50.46 34.88
0.9 10 2.2504 1.4186 53.20 4.1 4.4 6.05 65.30 41.10
0.98 50 3.9019 2.8020 76.37 6.7 8.8 11.03 98.43 54.31
0.99 100 4.6001 3.3869 86.17 7.8 10.6 13.17 112.50 59.84
0.999 1,000 6.9073 5.3194 118.54 11.6 16.6 20.26 159.05 78.03
0.9998 5,000 8.5171 6.6679 141.13 14.2 20.8 25.22 191.56 90.69
0.9999 10,000 9.2103 7.2486 150.85 15.3 22.7 27.35 205.56 96.14
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Figure 3.2. Storm depth–peak discharge transfer curve for the 6-hour rainfall in
the rural Vienna River watershed at the Halterbach node.
representing all uncertainties by the standard error SE(Tr). To achieve correspond-
ing plausible scattering, the underlying sample size is reduced to n = 30. The mean
value is estimated at 29.44 mm and the standard deviation is chosen manually at
15.7 mm.
The standard error SE obtained in Table 3.3 corresponds to 12, 15, and 16 per-
cent of the expected NTr of the 10, 100, and 1,000 year events, respectively. Nobilis
(1990) estimated a standard deviation of 15 percent of the expected extreme rainfall
in Austria. DWD (1997) and Skoda (2003) report similar deviations for Germany
and 24-hour rainfall in Lower Austria. As the expectations and confidence intervals
of the simplified and detailed uncertainty investigation diverge by less than 1 mm
and 5 mm, respectively, the simplified approach is implemented in the hydraulic
FORTRAN model developed by Faber and Nachtnebel (2003).
3.2.2 Rainfall-Runoff Transfer
The concept for transferring the storm depth into a rural and an urban contribu-
tion was discussed in section 3.1. The storm depth-peak discharge relations im-
plemented in this study are mainly derived from the calibrated catchment model
for the rural river basin (Neukirchen, 1995) and from a hydrodynamic urban runoff
model, which can handle the conduit network when it is loaded over its capac-
ity (Neukirchen, 2000). As neither project provides enough information on some
of the discrete events and the underlying models are not available, the continuous
curves comprise assumed data points beyond the conventional design calculations
and use linear interpolation. The assumed data points were obtained via the rain
depth-peak discharge gradient in Figure 3.2.
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Table 3.3. Estimated Gumbel parameters and extrapolated rain-depth values.
GUMBEL Parameter
Mean value Nm (mm) 29.44
Standard deviation SN (mm) 15.7
Sample size n 30
Reduced mean value Yη 0.5362
Reduced standard dev. SY η 1.1124
NTr SE NTr+2SE NTr-2SE
PM = 1-1/Tr Tr(a) YTr K (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm)
0.5 2 0.3665 –0.1525 27.05 2.65 32.34 21.75
0.8 5 1.4999 0.8664 43.04 4.81 52.66 33.43
0.9 10 2.2504 1.5410 53.63 6.64 66.92 40.35
0.98 50 3.9019 3.0257 76.94 10.92 98.79 55.10
0.99 100 4.6001 3.6533 86.80 12.77 112.34 61.26
0.997 300 5.7021 4.6439 102.35 15.70 133.76 70.94
0.999 1,000 6.9073 5.7273 119.36 18.93 157.22 81.50
0.9998 5,000 8.5171 7.1745 142.08 23.25 188.58 95.58
0.9999 10,000 9.2103 7.7976 151.86 25.12 202.09 101.63
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Figure 3.3. Gradient DQ(N)/DN from rainfall-runoff simulations (Neukirchen,
1995) with runoff coefficients y(N).
The rain depth-peak discharge curve at the Halterbach node, the lowest node of
the hydrologic model, for the system state without retention basins is extended by a
peak runoff coefficient of y = 79.6 percent (Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3). This value
is assumed constant because of the steady precipitation losses of saturated soils.
The magnitude corresponding to DQ/DN = 6.38 m3/s per additional 1 mm precip-
itation in 6-hour in the 173 km2 watershed is determined as the peak flow increase
between the simulated 118 and 134 mm/6-hour scenario. The rain depth-discharge
curve at Halterbach for the system state before the retention basin adaptation is ex-
tended by a peak runoff coefficient of 65.5 percent. This number is smaller than the
previous one because of the natural storage in the uncontrolled reservoirs. It refers
to DQ/DN = 5.25 m3/s,mm in 6 which is the peak discharge increase between the
simulated 118 and 134 mm/6-hour scenario. The curves representing the completed
adaptation and the assumed current state at Halterbach are supposed to converge to
the natural storage relation when rain depths become much larger than the designed
controllable capacity.
The relations for the urban runoff were extended by using the mean peak runoff
coefficient of the 118 to 134 mm segment of the five curves indicated in Figure 3.4.
Because of the dependency of rural and urban rainfall, only a reduced amount of the
urban runoff accounts for the design events of given return periods. The numbers
in Figure 3.4, resulting from hydrodynamic urban rainfall-runoff simulations and
the decrease to 70 percent are established by Neukirchen (2000). Table 3.4 shows a
summary of the raindepth-peak discharge relations used for the rural and the urban
catchment and their design return periods.
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Table 3.4. Summary of 6-hour rain depth-peak discharge reation, 17 October 2008.
Discharge rural catchment Discharge urban catchment
Down- Down-
Rain- Upstream stream Upstream stream
Return fall Lainzer Lainzer Ottakr. Ottakr.
period depth No Before Assumed Completed Bach Bach Bach Bach Month
Tr(a) (mm) retention upgrading current upgrading Km 8.24 Km 8.24 Km 2.4 Km 2.4 Km 0
1 28 44 43 42 43 8 16 28 31 35
10 51 122 120 119 119 25 37 62 71 77
30 65 184 180 179 180 27 52 67 77 85
100 84 278 197 252 226 28 62 71 81 91
1000 118 477 434 379 340 35 76 87 103 112
5000 134 579 518 495 478 37 81 92 106 119
160 745 655 640 630 40 87 100 115 128
200 1,000 865 865 865 44 95 111 127 142
250 1,319 1,127 1,127 1,127 49 105 125 143 160
300 1,637 1,390 1,390 1,390 55 116 139 159 178
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Figure 3.6. Total probability of failure for different structural and operational re-
tention basin states.
3.2.3 Probability of Failure
The hydrologic/hydraulic simulations for the conditional probability of failure in-
dicated in Figure 3.5 cover scenarios of 12 return periods Tr and different states
of the flood control reservoirs. The difference of a small shift in the fitted failure
curves stems from activating the Wienerwaldsee reservoir for active flood storage.
The failure curves in Figure 3.5 are a three-branched logarithmic (LOG) and a
cumulative log-normal function (LN) which are processed with the total probability
concept into the probability of failure. The small deviation of P(F) of the state be-
fore the upgrading of the Auhof and Mauerbach retention schemes and the current
state can be explained by hydrologic simplifications, the crude underlying data as-
sumptions, and the unintended smoothing effect of curve fitting. Figure 3.6 shows
the total probability of failure for different structural and operational retention basin
states.
4
Damage Assessment Model Development
The objective of Chapter 4 is to develop an empirically justified approach to mod-
eling financial losses from subway flooding. Here, we consider only direct tangible
damage via a two-pronged approach. The first part is to examine past instances of
catastrophic flooding of subways. The second is to examine and extend analytical
approximations used by Neukirchen (1994), based on expert judgment, to estimate
the losses from a catastrophic flood. These approaches are then compared and har-
monized to develop an empirically justified model for estimating the damage. A
major advantage of the review of past cases is that an approximation of the uncer-
tainty in the results can be developed by looking at the damage ranges in past major
floods.
It is clear that damage to a subway system would be a function of many vari-
ables, such as:
• Length of track flooded; level of standing water in the stations and along the
rails;
• Duration of the inundation (e.g., electrical systems may be designed to with-
stand short periods of rain but would fail when completely submerged for peri-
ods of hours or days);
• Velocity of the water (e.g., a slow rise in water level may not damage ballasted
track, whereas a high velocity current may scour ballast and foundations);
• Amount of warning time available for mitigation measures to be taken (e.g.,
operating protection systems, installing additional pumping capacity, removing
high-value equipment such as computers, etc.);
• Composition of the floodwater (e.g., salt water, silt-laden water, etc.); and
• Others not identified above.
Unfortunately, there are no data available to adequately characterize the quanti-
tative relationship between all these factors and the damage expected after a flood.
The situation is similar in this regard to the long-standing practices in potential
flood damage assessment, which can use only a subset of all possible contributory
factors. In this report, an approach to damage estimation will be used that is con-
ceptually similar to that of the use of depth-damage curves for flood damage assess-
ment (Penning-Roswell et al. 1977; N’Jai et al., 1990; Davis and Skaggs, 1992).
The basic approach to estimating the flood damage during flooding of the subway
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is to assume that there is a relationship between the length of track flooded and the
resulting direct damage, as carried out by Neukirchen (1994). This relationship can
be expressed as follows:
DD = α · L, (4.1)
where DD is the direct damage, L is the length of track flooded, and α is the rela-
tionship between the two variables.
As we were unable to obtain adequate empirical data on the effects of other fac-
tors, and as we wished to connect the output of the hydraulic model to the damage
estimation model, we evaluated the impact of the magnitude of the flooding by in-
troducing a modifying factor to adjust the damage estimates produced by Equation
4.1. The modifying factor is defined as a function of the rate (m/s) of overflowing
water.
β = f(Qoverflowing), (4.2)
where β is the damage multiplier and Qoverflowing is the rate at which water enters
the subway system because of overtopping or wall failure.
As there was no information available to evaluate this function, it was imple-
mented in the model by the use of a constrained engineering judgment. It was
assumed that the results of Equation 4.1 represent reasonable worst-case damage
and their modifying factor is defined on the interval (0.1). For convenience, we
choose an exponential function of the form
β = 1 − e
−λQoverflowing . (4.3)
This functional form has the advantage of being continuously differentiable and
of rising to close to the maximum at a rate controlled by the constant lambda. To
evaluate a conventional value for lambda, previous analyses by Neukirchen (1994)
were evaluated on the basis of engineering judgment. It was presumed that the
platforms are inundated quite quickly after water begins flowing into the subway
channel. We presume that damage begins to be incurred at a rate of 20 m3/s and
that an overflowing water discharge of 63 m3/s is sufficient to lead to significant
damage in the subway system. The water level in downstream subway stations was
modeled for this flow rate, and it was shown that the water level would inundate
platforms by significant amounts (0.5–2 m). Based on this, we presume that a level
close to the “maximum” level of damage (damage percentages corresponding to
the complete inundations experienced by Taipei, Prague, and Boston: see below)
are reached at flow rates slightly higher than 63 m3/s. We therefore choose lambda
to yield 50 percent of the maximum at a flow rate of 20 m3/s.
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The rather simplistic manner in which this factor is treated should not be taken
as an indication that it is trivial. This factor is very important in the integrated as-
sessment in that it is the point of linkage between the output of the hydraulic model
(Faber and Nachtnebel, 2003) and the damage model. As will become apparent,
the results of our model are not particularly sensitive to the functional form of this
factor. This is because of the nature of the floods faced by the system under study.
Flash floods which result in rapid rises in water level to a level that results in maxi-
mum damage tend to reduce this to a binary 0/1 variable. This may not be the case
in other systems in which the system reliability may attenuate flows or in which the
elements at risk have the ability to absorb exposure to the hazard before reaching
100 percent failure. Any application of the approach presented in this report would
require a careful consideration of the appropriate form for this factor.
The final form of the damage equation is therefore
DD = α(1 − e
−λQoverflowing)L. (4.4)
It is important to note that this procedure yields only a crude approximation of
the actual damages. The use of such a simple approximation inevitably introduces
large uncertainties in the resulting calculated damage. However, there are insuffi-
cient data to adequately quantify the results of the other factors. The examination of
actual case studies and the explicit evaluation of the uncertainties are thus a critical
part of any analysis of this kind.
With this approach in mind, we turn our attention to the development of an ap-
propriate value for alpha and its attendant uncertainties. We will do this by a review
of case studies and by examination of the approach implemented by Neukirchen
(1994).
4.1 Case Studies
A review of news reports was carried out to identify cases of flooding in sub-
ways. There have been a number of cases of flooded subways reported in the
last decade. In December 1992 a powerful storm near New York City resulted in
coastal flooding that inundated the Hoboken Terminal of the Port Authority Trans-
Hudson (PATH) Corporation. Approximately 1 km of the PATH tunnel was flooded
(Beardsley, 1993). In June 1999 heavy rainfall resulted in the inundation of several
subways in the city of Fukuoka, Japan, because of the sudden overtopping of the
Mikasa River (Toda and Inoue, 2002). On 17 December 1999 the subway system
in Caracas (Venezuela) was shut down as a result of flooding (Jones, 1999). Several
days of rain in Chile in June 2000 shut down the subway systems in Santiago and
Valparaiso (UPI, 2000). However, damage from these cases was not reported.
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There have been at least four cases in the past decade where floods were re-
ported to have caused direct damage amounting to more than AC10m (in repair costs)
and service outages of more than a week. Two of the most severe cases were dur-
ing the course of this study. These cases (Boston, October 1996; Seoul, May 1998;
Taipei, September 2001; and Prague, August 2002) will be described below.
4.1.1 Boston, Massachusetts, United States
The Massachusetts Bay Transport Authority operates four rapid transit lines of
100 km in length in the metropolitan Boston area known locally as the “T.” One
of these, which includes the oldest subway system in the United States, is the 40-
km-long Green Line (so named because it runs along the park system was designed
by Frederick Law Olmstead and is known as the “Emerald Necklace” of Boston).
On the weekend of 19–20 October 1996 a powerful storm system delivered over
250 mm of rain in Massachusetts over a period of two days. The rainfall caused a
tributary of the Charles River known as the Muddy River to overflow its banks near
its confluence with the Charles River. This, combined with the backing-up of the
local drainage systems due to the high level of the Muddy River, caused floodwater
to enter the subway system between the Kenmore Square and Hynes Convention
Center/ICA stops (see Figure 4.1). Most of the damage was associated with the
53,000 m3 of water that filled the Kenmore Square Station to a depth of over 7 m.
Other less-flooded stations included Symphony, Prudential, Hynes, Copley, and
Arlington. The total length of track flooded was approximately 2–3 km (Brown,
1996a, 1996b; CDM 2001; Moore and Chiasson 1996; Mercurio, 2002).
The design standard of the Boston metro was not reported, although the storm
was reported to be an approximately 200-year event. Damage was quite extensive.
Damaged items included track switch motors, signaling systems, power distribution
systems, tracks, and escalators. Much of the system was restored to operation
within a week, although signaling and track switching were carried out manually
for some time because of the loss of the electrical and communication systems.
No deaths or injuries were reported. The total damage was estimated as possibly
exceeding $10m, and the total cost of upgrades to the signaling system was over
$30m. Some of the repair and upgrade costs were to be financed by the U.S. federal
government through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (Brown 1996a,
1996b; Mercurio, 2002).
An interesting aspect of the Kenmore Square flooding is the failure of a portable
flood-barrier system installed after a catastrophic flood in 1962 (Mercurio, 2002;
Moore, 1997). Although the slots for a barrier had been installed, the boards used
to block the system could not be located in time to prevent the floodwater from
entering the station. Efforts to put sandbags in place failed, as they had in 1962.
The revised operating plan calls for provisions to adequately secure the boards
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Figure 4.1. Images from flooded Kenmore Square Station.
Photo Credits: WBZ-TV/CBS, WLVI-TV/WB, John Tlumacki (Boston Globe).
used to complete the flood barrier, including keeping the boards “under lock and
key near the tunnel entrance.” The temporary system has been installed on four
different occasions since the 1996 floods (Mercurio, 2002).
4.1.2 Seoul, South Korea
Subway Line 7, owned and operated by the Seoul Metropolitan Rapid Transit Cor-
poration, links northeast and southwest Seoul. Construction on Line 7 began in
1994 and was completed in 2000 at a total cost of 868.4 billion won (approximately
AC800m). The total line comprises 42 stations over a distance of 45 km between the
Jangam and Onsu Stations.
A review of press reports yielded relatively few data on the flooding that dam-
aged the line on 2 May 1998. The flooding occurred when retaining walls installed
at a construction site on Line 6 built along the Chungnang Stream were breached
at 7:30 A.M. during heavy rainfall. The water flowed into Taenung Station on
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Line 7 nine minutes later, and proceeded to inundate 11 stations over a length of
approximately 11 km with approximately 800,000 m3 of water. The primary dam-
age was to flooded electric facilities and communication systems. The damage was
reported to amount to around 45 billion won (approximately AC41.5m). Line 7 was
completely out of operation for nine days and was operated at reduced capacity
for a further 35 days. The line suffered a decline in ridership of approximately 40
percent (from 500,000 to 300,000 commuters per day) as a result of the reduced
capacity.
4.1.3 Taipei, Taiwan
The Taipei Rapid Transit Corporation (TRTC), a joint stock company financed
primarily (74 percent) by the Taipei City government, operates six subway
lines with a total of 66.7 km of track in the Taiwanese capital city of Taipei
(http://www.trtc.com.tw/).
On 16–17 September 2001 Typhoon Nari produced 425 mm of rain in Taipei
over a 24-hour period, causing the worst flooding in over 400 years (Chang, 2001).
The rains caused extensive flooding of the metro, resulting in the suspension of
operation of all subway lines with the exception of the elevated Mucha line (Hsu,
2001). The heavy rains flooded the control center in the basement of the Taipei
main station, Kunyang Station, and damaged the “third rail” between the Pannan
and Longshan Temple Station on the Pannan line. The flooding of the main railway
station occurred 12 hours after the flooding of Kunyang Station. The floodwaters
entered Kunyang station through a 6 m2 hole in the basement of the Chunghsiao-
Fuhsing station. This hole apparently should have been closed after completion of
construction, but this was overlooked by the contractor (Chuang, 2001) (see Figure
4.2). Attempts to sandbag the high point in the line at the Yung Chun station were
unsuccessful, and the floodwaters entered the Taipei Main Station at 11:45 A.M. on
17 September. The Municipal Rapid Transit (MRT) control station is located on
the third lower level of the Taipei main station, and the computer servers and power
supply are located on the fourth lower level. By 2:00 P.M. the floodwaters from the
main railway line had also entered the Taipei main station. By late afternoon the
control center had to be abandoned. Approximately 30 percent of the computers
and screens and all of the power supplies and cables, were lost (Kearns, 2001).
The line between Kuting and Nanshihchiao was reopened on 20 September, and
the north–south Tamsui–Hsientien line was back in limited operation on 1 October,
with the exception of the Shuanlien stop and the Taipei main station. The Panchiao–
Nankang line between Hsinpu and Hsimen was restored to operation on 14 October,
with the Hsiaonanmen extension opening on 17 October. By 14 October the system
was back up to 58 percent of its pre-typhoon daily average of 900,000 passengers
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Figure 4.2. Cleanup and repair work on the MRT.
Photo credits: George Tsorng, Taipei Times.
per day. The line between Hsimen and Chunghsiao-Fuhsing was reopened on 27
October (Shu-Ling, 2001).
Typhoon Nari, which was a 200-year flood event, exceeded the design standard
for flood protection of the Taipei metro. According to Kuo Tsai-ming, deputy di-
rector of the TRTC, the most affected systems were “communications equipment,
escalators, fire safety equipment, the drainage system, and the wire and ventilation
systems installed in the ceiling” (Shu-Ling, 2001). Another report indicates that the
repair of the electrical systems was “by far the most daunting task” (Chou, 2001).
No deaths or injuries were reported as a result of the subway flooding, although
approximately 100 people were killed during the typhoon, mainly as a result of
mudslides in the north of Taiwan.
Reports of the estimated direct repair costs for the flooded subway ranged
between AC66 and 140m (2–4 billion new Taiwan dollars [NT$]) (Kearns, 2001;
Surenkok, 2001). In a final report on the total repair bill, this amount was lowered
to NT$53m because of cost savings associated with “donations of construction ma-
terials and reduced prices from companies not wanting to be seen as making a profit
from the typhoon’s aftermath” (Shu-Ling, 2001). Funding for repairs was sought
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from the municipal Department of Rapid Transit Systems, which tried to raise fund-
ing from both the central government and through “austerity measures” conducted
in other municipal bureaus and departments (Shu-Ling, 2001). Insurance was not
available, as the system was insured only against fire and lightning damage. Ac-
cording to Lee Po-Wen, chairman of the TRTC, the system was not insured against
typhoons because of the high annual premium costs of AC3.3m, or NT$100m per
year (Kearns, 2001).
4.1.4 Prague, Czech Republic
The Prague metro, built in the 1970s and 1980s and operated by the Prague Public
Transit Co. Inc., consists of three lines covering 50 km with 51 stations (ww.dp-
praha.cz). Daily ridership is approximately 1.2m. As the system was also designed
to serve as a fallout shelter, many stations were built with steel doors that would
seal off the stations in the event of either flood or nuclear attack (Krushelnycky,
2002).
In August 2002 there were two exceptionally heavy periods of rain in the Bo-
hemian basin due to a slow-moving tropical depression. The first occurred between
6 and 7 August. The second occurred between 11 and 13 August (www.praha-
mesto.cz/povoden). In Prague, the Vltava River began to rise on 12 August. On 14
August the river rose rapidly and overflowed its banks (Kikuchi and Sasaki, 2002).
The low-lying Karlin district was the most severely affected. Although 1 m high
barricades were erected, the water overflowed the barricades, entering the Florenc,
Krizikova, Invalidovna, and Palmovka stations on the B Line in the Karlin dis-
trict and the Nadrazi Holesovice subway/train station on the C Line (Metrostav,
2002). Because of the depth of the subway lines, water cascaded through the tun-
nels, flooding approximately 17 stations (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4) over a distance
of approximately 20 km. Although the flooding appeared first on the B Line, the
underlying A Line was flooded when a wall collapsed in Mustek station, which is
on both the A and B Lines. One station (Florenc) was reported to be flooded to
a depth of 35 m, with two trains trapped on the tracks (Carey, 2002). Over one
million m3 of water were pumped out of the system (Konviser, 2002). The return
period of the water levels in the Vltava River was estimated to correspond to a 500-
year flow. The peak flow rate during the flood was estimated as 5,300 m3/s, which
compares to a annual average flow of 145 m3/s and a 100-year return flow of 3,700
m3 per second (http://www.praha-mesto.cz/povoden/).
The metro was at least partially insured by Ceska Kooperativa (Insurance Let-
ter, 2002). Approximately AC100m of a European Investment Bank loan was ear-
marked for repair costs to the metro (CAN, 2002). The loan was for 30 years
with a 7-year grace period (EIB, 2002). There was considerable controversy sur-
rounding the flooding of the metro. It was reported that the emergency door in the
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Figure 4.3. Extent of flooding in the Prague metro.
Photos from http://metro.mysteria.cz/povoden.swf.
Invalidovna station failed, which caused flooding in other stations. A complicating
factor appears to have been that the metro was kept running as the waters rose, as
forecasts had predicted that flood peaks would be considerably lower than those
that actually occurred.
4.1.5 Summary
A summary of the damage resulting from flooding on subways is given in Table 4.1.
Damage was reported to be primarily associated with electrical/electronic com-
ponents such as power-supply systems, communications and signaling, escalators,
ventilation, etc. Systems were typically completely out of operation for weeks to
months and were operated on the basis of temporary measures (manual signaling,
etc.) for up to several months. Although there was significant loss of life during the
events in Taiwan and South Korea, none of this was reported to be due to flooding
on the subway.1 The deaths reported during these events were primarily associated
1However, Toda and Inoue (2002) report that an employee of a restaurant located in an under-
ground space died when trapped by the floodwater during the 1999 Fukuoka subway flood in Japan.
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Figure 4.4. Damage in the Prague metro.
Photos from http://tom.vlakpage.cz/index.htm.
Table 4.1. Summary of reported damage in subway flooding incidents.
Boston, 1996 Seoul, 1998 Taipei, 2001 Prague, 2002
Total cost (ACm) n/a 790* 15,000** n/a
Total repair cost per km (ACm) n/a 18 ∼180 n/a
Km track flooded 02/03/03 11 9–12 15–20
Volume of water (thousand m3) 53 800 (n/r) >1,000
Reported flood damage ∼10 40 60–140 66–240
Computed damage per km 1.3–4 ∼3.6 0.9–12 4.44–16
*Line 7 only
**Entire system (86 km)
with mudslides, people drowning in swollen rivers, and electrocution from dam-
aged electrical equipment. A common feature reported in all of these episodes was
that human error was a contributory, and, in some cases, a major factor. Errors
ranged from overly optimistic hydraulic forecasts to incomplete or inadequate con-
struction methods and the failure to install or implement protective action. We note
that an evaluation of the reliability of any active system requiring human input or
control should include the reliability of the operators. For some protective systems,
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Table 4.2. Range of length flooded/damage ratios.
Boston Seoul Taipei Prague
1996 1998 2001 2002
Length
flooded
(km) 2 2 3 3 11 12 12 9 9 20 20 20 15 15 15
Repair
cost
(ACm) 10 40 10 40 35 140 53 140 53 66 180 240 66 180 240
alpha 5.0 20 3.3 13 3.2 12 4.4 16 5.9 3.3 9.0 12 4.4 12 16
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Figure 4.5. Relationship between reported damage and length flooded.
especially those requiring a high degree of reliability, human error may turn out to
be the most significant limiting factor in the reliability of the system.
With this information, we may estimate alpha on the basis of a statistical anal-
ysis of the rather limited data. To estimate the damage factor, a full factorial design
on track length flooded and damage estimates was used to generate all possible
combinations of damage reported and track length flooded (see Table 4.2).
A simple analysis of these values yields a mean of 9.4 and a range from 3.2
to 20. However, to avoid artificially weighting the cases where there were addi-
tional estimates (e.g., Prague), synthetic data points were generated, for example,
by taking the arithmetic average of the length flooded and the repair costs. An
appropriate number of these synthetic centroids was used (five for Seoul and two
for Boston and Taipei) to ensure that all cases were equally weighted. A simple
arithmetic average is then 8.1.
A regression was performed to evaluate alpha for the overall dataset and is
shown in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.6. Distribution of length/damage ratios.
To estimate the range, we examined a frequency distribution, as shown in
Figure 4.6.
4.2 Analytical/Cost-Estimation Approach
A second approach is to decompose the subway system into major systems (e.g.,
track, communication systems, power systems, etc.) and estimate the percentage
of damage to the different systems as a result of flooding. This approach is simi-
lar to that developed in the FLAIR report (N’Jai et al., 1990) to develop synthetic
depth damage curves. If the linear cost of these systems (cost per kilometer as con-
structed) is known, the appropriate percentages can be multiplied by replacement
cost to yield a total damage per length.
In Neukirchen (1994), the damage estimation makes the assumption that the
damages could be estimated using a range of 10 percent of the construction costs
and 15–20 percent of the electrical costs. As-built costs for subway systems in the
United States are shown in Table 4.3.
Assuming that stations are located at intervals of approximately 1 km, the
total cost of at-grade systems averages $9m/km and ranges from $8–42m/km,
whereas the average total cost of subway systems is $48m/km and ranges from
$25–120mr/km. Electrical systems comprise approximately 38 percent of the to-
tal systems and guideway cost for at-grade systems but only 9 percent for subway
systems (presumably reflecting the larger component due to excavation costs). As-
suming that these ratios can also be used to characterize the ratio of electrical instal-
lation/total installation costs of stations, we find that the electrical components are
approximately $2.4m for subway systems as against $3.1m for at-grade systems).
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Table 4.3. Reported costs of subway components ($m).
Component Median Average St. dev Range
Systems* 1.9 2.4 1.2 1.4–5.4
At-grade components
At grade-ballast guideway 1.7 3.9 5.4 1.2–17.9
At-grade center platform station 9.3 9.0 5.1 4–19
At-grade side platform station 7.4 7.2 0.5 7–7.6
Underground components
Underground guideway 21 24 11 16–52
Subway center platform station 29 28 13 8–59
Subway side platform station 24 24 3 20–27
*Systems represent primarily electrical and electronic components
Source: Laver and Schneck (1996)
One would, a priori, expect these to be similar. By way of comparison, it appears
that the Vienna metro is rather expensive. The overall estimated construction cost
was given as ranging from AC44–145m/km, with the estimated construction cost of
the U4 between Ober St. Veit and Kettenbru¨ckengasse (roughly speaking, an at-
grade system) given as AC58m/km.2 This is above the range reported by Laver and
Schneck (1996) for the United States. The reason could be the use of different ex-
change rates and also the lack of inclusion of soft cand special costs, such as land
acquisition, utility relocations, and various engineering design and management
costs. In addition, labor and tax costs may also vary significantly between Austria
and the United States.
If we assume that the electrical components comprise approximately 40 per-
cent of the cost of at-grade systems, that the damage to electrical systems is ap-
proximately 15–20 percent of construction costs, and that damage to construction
represents approximately 10 percent of construction costs, then we obtain a dam-
aged fraction ranging from 11–14 percent of construction costs for at-grade systems
and 10–11 percent for subway systems. Using these ranges, and applying these val-
ues to the ranges reported above in Laver and Schneck (1996) for at-grade systems,
we obtain a range of $0.9–6m/km. Application to subway systems yields $2.8–
17m/km. One can perform a similar exercise for costs associated with the Vienna
metro (Table 4.4).
2The rates were originally given in Austrian Schillings, which were pegged at 13.7603 ¨OS per
euro in 1999. As the euro did not exist in 1993, when these estimates were provided, the cost is
converted at the official rate adopted when the euro was adopted. The range was given as 600m to 2
billion Schillings per km, with the cost on the U4 between Ober St. Veit and Kettenbru¨ckengasse as
AC800m per km.
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Table 4.4. Ranges of damage per kilometer flooded: Method 2.
Damage % Total costs
At-grade $8–42m 10–14% $0.8–6m
Subway $25–120m 10–11% $2.5–13m
Vienna, at-grade AC58m 10–14% AC5.8–8.1m
Vienna, subway AC44–145m 10–11% AC4.4–16m
Table 4.5. Adopted values for alpha and beta for use in Equation 4.4.
Parameter Value from [21] Value in this study
Damage per length of track flooded (α) 7 U(1,20)
Damage multiplier (β) 1* 1-exp(−λQ)
*Implicit: damage was defined at 63 m3/s.
4.3 Summary
The data from the empirical studies suggest that the values for alpha could range
from AC3–20m/km of track flooded, with a most likely value of around 5. The
results from the engineering estimation yield estimates of between 1 and 16, with
the most likely value being between 5 and 12. Considering the many uncertainties,
we believe this to be relatively good agreement, given that these estimates were
developed using independent methods.
In light of these examinations, we have defined the values of alpha and beta
according to Table 4.5. It is felt that these represent a reasonable estimate of the
uncertainty in the potential damage, as the range is supported by two independent
lines of evidence. Subjectively, it is believed that the use of these values will result
in slightly conservative (high) estimates of the damage. The data drawn from case
studies may be subject to selection bias (i.e., episodes resulting in extensive damage
tend to result in more news coverage than those resulting in minimal damage).
The analytical estimates may be biased by the potentially high as-built costs of
the Vienna subway. However, this conservative approach is not expected to be
a major factor and is judged to be well within the bounds of the intervals given.
Furthermore, sensitivity studies can be performed to examine the impact of this
possibly conservative approach.
The basic damage equation is therefore largely a function of two stochastic
variables, alpha and Q. The distribution of alpha, which has a simple distributional
form, was the subject of Chapter 4. The distribution of Q was based on the hy-
draulic simulation model, as discussed previously. This is a nonstandard distribu-
tion, suggesting the use of numerical techniques. The way in which this equation
is implemented is the subject of the next chapter.
5
Abstraction Methodology and
Implementation
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the way in which a model was constructed
to tie together the analyses described in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 corresponds
to the “scientific” or “hazard” module discussed in the introduction, and Chap-
ter 4 to the “engineering” or loss computation module. As discussed, each of those
analyses provides a set of distributional inputs. This chapter discusses the final
step, namely, the integrating module. This corresponds to the “insurance coverage”
module discussed previously. However, the integrating module need not focus on
insurance coverage. This approach can also be used to illustrate the effect of dif-
ferent mitigation measures on absorbed damage.
This chapter therefore attempts to fulfill three objectives. The first is to illus-
trate a method for dealing with both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty using a risk
curve. The second is to create appropriate model abstractions. As the analysis
provided in Faber and Nachtnebel (2003) and summarized in Chapter 3 was very
detailed, there was a need to create a “reduced form” of the analyses contained in
that report. Running the type of physical simulation analyses carried out in Chap-
ter 3 is computationally prohibitive, as the simulation must consider hundreds or
thousands of simulations of different possible values. In such cases, a reduced
form may be substituted for the more complex model. The goal of the reduced or
abstracted model is to capture the salient elements of the more complex results (cf.
Morgan and Henrion 1991, p. 215). The third and final goal of this chapter is to
introduce and define the different hypothetical structural and non-structural miti-
gation measures considered in this case study. Two structural measures (detention
basins and portable flood barriers) were considered in conjunction with three finan-
cial measures (reserve funds, borrowing, and insurance). The way in which these
were abstracted and parameterized will also be discussed in this chapter. The basic
approach to developing the risk curve was adapted from Ermolieva et al. (2001)
and is as follows:
1. Identify a planning period of interest (PPI) corresponding the time frame of
concern of the decision maker.
2. Assume that a severe storm of an arbitrary magnitude occurs within the PPI
and compute the a priori likelihood of that storm based upon a known rainfall-
probability distribution such as a Gumbel distribution. Repeat this process multiple
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times to produce a set of rainfall-probability pairs. To increase computational effi-
ciency, sample only from events that are likely to cause damage. For example, as
damage is not expected in storms with recurrence intervals of less than 100 years,
only storms with recurrence periods exceeding this value are considered. It should
be noted that this introduces a conditional probability; namely, we are sampling
from a subset of all possible storms and must therefore apply the appropriate prob-
ability correction to convert the conditional probabilities computed in the model to
absolute probabilities.
3. Transform the rainfall, using an appropriate rainfall-runoff relationship, to
discharge into the Vienna River. Determine the amount of water entering the sub-
way system as a result of this rainfall. This step corresponds to the computation of
water levels in a more traditional flood risk assessment concerned with damage to
structures in a floodplain, such as was implemented in Ermolieva et al. (2001). The
effects of ex ante structural mitigation measures, which influence the level of wa-
ter entering the system, are considered at this point. The set of rainfall-probability
pairs has now been transformed into a set of overflowing water-probability pairs.
4a. Determine the direct tangible damage resulting from the overflowing water.
The set of rainfall-probability pairs has now been transformed into a set of direct
damage-probability pairs. Plot the sets of damage/probability pairs on the risk
curve described previously. If parameter values were sampled from distributions
representing epistemic uncertainty in the preceding calculations, a scatterplot will
be generated.
4b. To provide a clear representation of the relationships, produce curves rather
than scatterplots by taking subsets corresponding to specified probability intervals
and computing the mean or fractiles of the distributions. This represents a con-
ditional probability distribution representing the epistemic uncertainty in damage,
given that an event falling within a specified probability band (e.g., the 100-year
flood) occurs. Note that this distribution may not be a normal distribution, so use
of the standard deviation to determine confidence intervals is suspect, unless it has
been verified that the conditional distributions are in fact normal distributions. This
can be done formally or simply and quickly by plotting the conditional frequency
histogram and ensuring that the distribution is not skewed or overly broad/narrow.
The simplest way to generate this is simply to compute means or fractiles directly
from the sample.1 This was the approach chosen here.
5. Estimate the impact of non-structural mitigation measures such as insurance
or reserve funds on the total pre- and post-disaster costs incurred to manage the
flood. This is done by estimating the extent to which the losses can be compensated
for from a reserve fund or an insurance policy, and if the losses cannot be fully
1The careful reader might note that the way in which the estimator is computed and its potential
error may also be a function of the distribution. We do not deal with this problem in this analysis.
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covered, obtain a loan to cover the costs. The premiums paid before the event are
counted as costs, as are the interest payments made on any loans taken out after the
event.
These steps are described in more detail below. Details of the algorithms used
are given in this section.
5.1 Model Abstraction: Flood Hazard Analysis
The hazard analysis was developed from the analysis discussed in Chapter 3 and in
extensive detail in Faber and Nachtnebel (2003). It became clear from the discus-
sions and review of the analyses that the uncertainty in the rainfall—particularly for
rare events—was a major driver of the uncertainty in the likelihood of catastrophic
floods. It was therefore deemed desirable to evaluate this directly within the model
and separate the problem of system failure into two components:
1) Determination of the distribution of rainfall and runoff in the river, with the
attendant uncertainties; and
2) Determination of the conditional likelihood and magnitude of system failure
that occurs at different levels of runoff.
The algorithm chosen to do this was introduced previously. A more detailed
description follows.
5.1.1 Rainfall Determination
The first step is to sample from a probability distribution describing the peak 6-hour
rainfall. This can be done either by sampling the rainfall and then determining the
probability of occurrence from the appropriate probability distribution or by sam-
pling a probability and then determining the associated rainfall. For the purposes
of computational efficiency, we selected a procedure that provided increased sam-
pling of low-probability events. A variant of importance sampling was chosen to
provide even coverage of the tails of the distribution by sampling over the negative
log of the probability from a uniform distribution. The rainfall corresponding to the
selected probability was then determined. Based on the analyses in Chapter 3, the
probability of the selected rainfall was presumed to follow a Gumbel Type I distri-
bution. The Gumbel Type I distribution is defined by the Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF) given (Beyer, 1968) as:
F (n) = exp(−exp(= n−α
β
)), (5.1a)
The mean and variance of this distribution are given by:
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Figure 5.1. Rain depth as a function of return period.
µn = α+ 0.5772β
σ2n =
pi2β2
6
(5.1b)
Given an exceedance probability p, the rainfall to which it corresponds can also
therefore be solved.
n = α− βln(−ln(p)) (5.2)
The resulting set of (n,p) pairs defines the probabilistic rainfall-recurrence re-
lationship. The results for the Gumbel distribution with a mean value of 29.44 and
a standard deviation of 16.75 are illustrated in Figure 5.1.
5.1.2 Flow Rate Determination
The next step is to determine the flow rate of the Vienna River at Km 4 resulting
from the sampled rainfalls. This problem was discussed in Chapter 3. Detention
basins are installed upstream, and these function by modifying the downstream
flow rate. They do this by accumulating water while the river is rising, thereby
moderating the rise in water levels downstream and then releasing the water levels
after the flood peak has passed. At some point, however, the basins may become
full and lose their ability to store water for later discharge. As discussed by Faber
and Nachtnebel (2003), modifications are being carried out to give operators more
control over the filling and emptying of the basins.
Therefore, the downstream discharge is a function of both the peak rainfall
and the basin state. This was examined by the use of a detailed rainfall-runoff
model. As the incorporation of the detailed model is computationally prohibitive,
a reduced-form model is used that determines the discharge at Vienna River Km 4
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Table 5.1. Rainfall-runoff relations at Vienna River Km 4 as a function of basin
state.
Peak Discharge at Vienna River, Km 4 (m3/s)
6-hour No Non- Assumed Upgrades
Rainfall (mm) basins upgraded current complete
0 0 0 0 0
28 69 68 66 68
51 177 175 175 174
65 247 243 242 243
84 346 265 320 294
118 561 518 463 424
134 668 607 584 567
160 841 751 737 726
200 1106 971 971 971
300 1770 1522 1522 1522
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Figure 5.2. Rainfall-runoff relations at Vienna River Km 4 as a function of basin
state.
corresponding to the sampled rainfall by the use of the lookup tables given in Chap-
ter 3 and reproduced here in Table 5.1. These lookup tables simulate the effect
of the retention basins in one of four possible states: no retention basins, non-
upgraded retention basins, upgrades to Auhof-Mauerbach retention basins only (the
assumed current condition), and completed upgrades on all retention basins.
The resulting deterministic discharge exceedance curves shown in Figure 5.2
are based on the rainfall-return period plot shown above.
We note that this approach implies that there is no uncertainty associated with
the response of the detention basins. The computed uncertainty in the discharge
is simply the transformation of the uncertainty in the rainfall. A more complete
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analysis might include the effect of the uncertainty in the rainfall-runoff model,
developed by running the rainfall-runoff model with the rainfall as a constant value,
with the other parameters being allowed to vary stochastically. However, as we
believe that the uncertainties in the rainfall are likely to dominate the uncertainties
introduced by the detention basins, and as the model is intended to be for illustrative
purposes only, we simply include the deterministic lookup tables.
5.1.3 Overflow Determination
The final step is to determine the amount of water flowing into the subway. Based
on examination of the results in Faber (2003) and in Chapter 3, it was hypothesized
that the flow rate of overflowing water could be roughly estimated from the flow
rate in the main channel. This hypothesis was generated by the observation that the
likelihood of the failure of the system appeared to be correlated with the probability
that the flow exceeded some critical level. Furthermore, it was assumed that flow
in the U4 can be represented by the difference between the critical level of flow
and the flow in the channel. The observation that the failure probability seemed to
track flow exceedance probability suggests that the probability of failure increases
dramatically once some “critical” flow is exceeded. This hypothesis appears valid
based on an examination of the system and on inspection of the results in Faber and
Nachtnebel (2003). A failure that results in the release of water to the U4 occurs
when the discharge into the Vienna River exceeds the given threshold, resulting
either in overtopping of the floodwall or collapse of the floodwall due to either
foundation scouring or hydrostatic pressure. It is clear that an overtopping failure
is largely a function of the flow rate in the channel and that the uncertainties are
largely those associated with the channel geometry, wall height, and roughness
coefficients. As this is a channelized river with a well characterized geometry, it is
not thought that these contribute substantially to the uncertainty in the water flow
rate at which overtopping is expected. Similarly, erosive failure and wall collapse is
largely a function of the computed shear at the channel bed and the shear strength
of the invert. There is likely to be more uncertainty in these parameters. It was
determined that a failure leading to overflowing of the U4 occurs at a discharge of
approximately 530 m3/s. Because of the uncertainties in the resistance parameters
of the floodwall, however, this is not a fixed value but is represented by a probability
distribution. In this simulation the “critical” discharge is modeled as a normal
distribution with mean 530 and standard deviation of 10 m3/s. This implies that
the failure of the basin could occur with a 5 percent probability at a flow rate of
510 m3/s and would be almost (95 percent) certain to occur once flows in the main
channel exceeded 550 m3/s.
QU4 = QCRITICAL − QVRK4; QVRK4 = f(N) (5.3)
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Figure 5.3. Estimation of overflowing water. Upper: approximate peak overflow
rate. Lower: approximate total overflowing volume.
Figure 5.3 illustrates the relationship between the estimated peak discharge and
the flow into the subway terrace with a Q CRIT of 530 m3/s. Also shown is an
indication of the total volume of water discharged into the terrace. Although the
hydrograph was not computed, this plot was produced by approximating the peak
of the hydrograph as a triangle and assuming that the duration of the flooding over
the critical discharge is proportional to the difference between the peak discharge
and the critical discharge. For this curve, it was assumed that a peak discharge of
730 m3/s would result in a period of three hours above the critical discharge of 530
m3/s.
It is important to note that this distribution is a rough approximation used to
abstract the reliability assessment provided by Faber and Nachtnebel (2003). If
this analysis were to be extended, it would be desirable to conduct a more detailed
examination of this conditional failure probability distribution. However, for the
purposes of illustration, we will proceed with this rough approximation. Provided
that the “critical level of flow” hypothesis is valid, the model could easily be up-
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dated simply by changing the parameters of the distribution for the critical level
of flow value. It is believed that the second approximation, that of computing the
discharge in the subway as the difference between the runoff and the critical level
of flow, is a reasonable assumption for flows below that necessary for the water
level in the terrace to equal that of the main channel. At higher flows, this would be
an overestimation, as a portion of the flow would be carried into the main channel.
For collapse failures, this could be a significant underestimation. Once the collapse
occurred, a significant amount of channel flow might be diverted into the subway
terrace. However, because of the way in which the damage function to the sub-
way is defined, these are not critical. We also note that this approach captures the
characteristic that the protective system is a hard-fail rather than soft-fail system.
In other words, the system of detention basins and masonry floodwalls provides a
very high level of protection up to a certain river flow rate. However, once that
system fails, the level of damage can be expected to rise rapidly. This is in contrast
to a soft-fail system such as flood hardening, which would increase the ability of
the system to withstand inundation.2
5.2 Damage Assessment
As discussed previously, we consider the damage to be a function of the length of
the track flooded. Model abstraction is not needed for this part of the analysis, as
the damage estimation technique was sufficiently simple as to be computationally
inexpensive, and it was developed with implementation in the catastrophe model
in mind. Estimation of the physical damage requires two parameters: the length of
track flooded and the damage per length flooded.
5.2.1 Length Flooded
It is assumed that the subway consists of two sections. One section is not protected
by a floodgate and is inundated whenever there is a flood (although the damage may
be equal to zero; see below for the definition of the damage multiplier). This section
is approximately 7.5 km long from the location where the U4 crosses the Vienna
River at Km 10.63 to the portable flood barriers installed at the Grosse Einwo¨lbung
at approximately Km 3.1. It is conservatively assumed that the inundation can
occur at any point along the section. This assumption is conservative, as the most
2This is not intended as a critique of the well-designed flood protection system in place. Imple-
mentation of flood hardening for the Vienna subway may be overly expensive, infeasible, or even
impossible. The point is to illustrate the financial characteristics of different mitigation alternatives
and combinations of these.
3The point of a likely first inundation was reported (Neukirchen, 1994) to be located at Braun-
schweiggasse at Km 8.6. This would yield a distance of 5.5 km for the unprotected reach.
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likely point for flooding to occur is just prior to installation of the portable flood
barrier. A better distribution would therefore be positively skewed, making flooding
to shorter track lengths more likely than flooding to longer track lengths A more
detailed model might consider the conditional probability of flooding and explicitly
model failure probabilities at each location, generating a conditional probability
distribution of the length flooded. Such an analysis was not performed, however,
and the length flooded in this section was therefore modeled as a uniform random
variable U(0,7.5) to determine the length of unprotected track flooded.
The other section is protected by a floodgate. If the floodgate works, none of
the section is flooded. If the floodgate fails, all of this section is flooded. However,
the length of track that is protected by the floodgate is not precisely known, as the
entire system was not modeled. Because of the lack of detailed analyses, this was
treated as an epistemic uncertainty and was modeled as a random variable with an
upper and lower bound. Potential upper and lower bounds on the lengths at risk
were estimated. We take, as a minimum, that the U4 would be flooded as far as
the outlet into the Donaukanal for a total inundated stretch of 3.1 km. As water
entering Karlsplatz station could provide a point of entry for water into the U1 line,
we assume that the U1 would be flooded, at a minimum, between Su¨dtirolerplatz
and Reumannplatz, for a total distance of 2.9 km. To set an upper bound, we pre-
sume that the maximum stretch of the U1 that could be flooded would be between
Reumannplatz and Vorgartenstrasse, for a maximum inundation potential of 6.5 km
for the U1. Water entering either Wien Mitte station via the U4 or Stephansplatz
station via the U1 could result in flooding of the U3. We take, at a minimum,
flooding of the U3 between Burggasse and Schlachthausgasse for a total of 4.4 km
flooded. To set an upper bound, we assume that the U3 could be flooded as far as
Simmering, for a total inundation length of 7.7 km. This results in the following
upper and lower bounds:
Protected stretch (lower bound): 3.1 km U4 + 2.9 km U1 + 4.4 km U3 = 10.4 km
Protected stretch (upper bound): 3.1 km U4 + 6.5 km U1 + 7.7 km U3 = 17.3 km
We therefore model the length flooded as the sum of a U(0,7.5) and a
U(10.4,17.3) distribution.
LengthFlooded =
{
U(0, 7.5), FloodgateFailureType = 0
U(0, 7.5) + U(10.4, 17.3) FloodgateFailureType = 1
5.2.2 Damage per Length Flooded
As discussed in Chapter 4, it is assumed that the damage per length flooded (alpha)
is a uniform variable ranging from AC1–20m per km flooded. As previously noted,
there were insufficient data to establish an empirically or theoretically grounded
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Figure 5.4. Comparison of the synthetic conditional damage distribution for Vi-
enna with case study reports.
relationship between overflowing water and damage. However, it was clear that
at low flows (which we define as 5–10 m3/s) the damage would be slight, and
that damage would increase quickly as the pumping and drainage capacity of the
subway was overloaded, quickly reaching the maximum potential damage. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 4, an exponential form was chosen for mathematical convenience
to represent the relationship between overflowing water and percentage of damage.
To reflect the sharp rise in damage caused by overflowing water, an exponential
function discussed in Chapter 4 was chosen. The value of lambda was chosen to
give damage of 50 percent at a flow of 20 m3/s.
λ =
ln(2)
20m
3
S
= 0.35 (5.4)
Figure 5.4 illustrates the synthetic conditional damage curves and shows how
these compare to the ranges of damage reported for catastrophic flooding in similar
systems.
For distributional sensitivity analyses, an alternative variant explored was the
use of normal rather than uniform distributions to estimate the damage. In this vari-
ant, the variable representing the length of the protected areas of track was modeled
as a normal distribution with mean 13.85 and standard deviation of 3.45. The dis-
tribution was truncated at zero to ensure that no negative values were obtained.
Likewise, the damage function was modeled as a normal distribution with mean
10 and standard deviation 5, and was again truncated at zero to ensure no negative
damage.
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The loss of revenue associated with foregone fares was also considered. To ob-
tain a rough order-of-magnitude estimate of this effect, we assume that the service
interruption is also a function of the length of track flooded. Based on the experi-
ence of past inundations, we take this value as 5 days per km of track flooded. In
2001 the total subway ridership was approximately 400m passengers (Wiener Lin-
ien, 2002). Dividing this number by 365 days per year and assuming that the U4
carries approximately 20 percent of the passenger load, we obtain a daily ridership
on the U4 of approximately 200,000 rides. At a ride cost of AC2, we can derive a
total fare loss of approximately AC2m per km flooded. As this is only a small part
of the maximum total potential damage, we assume this to already be subsumed
within the damage estimates. A more detailed analysis might be able to explore
this in more detail by examining the effect on revenue of planned outages while
tracks are closed for normal maintenance. The exercise discussed here was simply
a quick examination of the potential relative contribution to losses from foregone
fares and repair costs.
5.3 Financial Parameters
In this section, we will introduce and discuss the implementation of a number of
different potential financial mitigation measures. Direct damage is the input to
the financial module. Two ex ante financing measures, insurance and a reserve
fund, are considered. One ex post financing measures, borrowing, is considered.
Budgetary diversion would be simple to include, but was not implemented in this
version of the model. The methods for computing financial parameters follows Er-
molieva (2001) and Mechler and Pflug (2002), and the nomenclature of the model
parameters follows Mechler and Pflug (2002). We note that inflationary risks are
not computed explicitly. All amounts are computed in real terms. This introduces
a bias. In particular, insurance is not adjusted for potential changes in inflation,
whereas inflationary risks associated with investment assets are included implicitly
by the use of a real rather than nominal rate of return. If the insurance contract is
denominated in a stable currency, such as dollars, euros, or Swiss francs, this may
not be a major issue. However, if the insurance contract is denominated in a poten-
tially unstable currency, and adequate contractual safeguards are not maintained,
there could be considerable inflationary risks in the value of the insurance contract.
5.3.1 Determine the Timing of the First Severe Event
An important parameter in examining the impact of different financial measures
such as insurance or reserve funds is the arrival time of the first event, as this will
determine the extent to which a reserve fund has accumulated funds or for how long
premiums have been paid. The arrival time of the first occurrence of an event that
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can occur in any year with constant probability p is given by a geometric distribu-
tion (Beyer 1968).
P (t = τ) = f(τ) = p(1 − p)τ−1 (5.5)
It can be shown that, by expanding the terms in a binomial expansion, this
approaches a uniform distribution with
P (t = τ |τ < T ) + f(τ) =
P (t = τ)
P (τ < T )
=
p(1 − p)τ−1
1− (1 − p)T−1
∼=
1
T − 1
(5.6)
as pT << 1. The arrival time is therefore modeled as a uniform distribution.
5.3.2 Insurance
Insurance can be simulated as either proportional insurance or as excess of loss
insurance, or both. However, the model is limited in that it is currently possible to
define only one layer. The following parameters are used to characterize insurance:
• The attachment point, or “deductible,” of the insurance. One hundred percent
of all losses below the attachment point are borne by the policyholder.
• The proportion of losses within the insured layer borne by the policyholder.
Setting this value to 1 causes insurance to be inactive (i.e., if the policyholder
bears 100 percent of the losses, then the insurer pays no claims).
The claims are computed as a proportion to the total loss exceeding the attachment
point. However, to define the upper limit of the layer, the claim payments are
capped by an exit point.
• The exit point, or “cap,” of the insurance. This is the maximum claim payment
by the insurer.
Claims are therefore computed by the following relation:
Claim=min(Exit Point,(1- Proportion)*max(0, Damage-Attachment Point)).
The resulting relationship between claim payments, retained losses, and dam-
age is illustrated in Figure 5.5, which shows the effect of an attachment point of
AC10m in direct damages, a 20 percent coinsurance proportion, and an exit point of
AC100m in claims.
There are two possibilities for determining risk premiums. One would be to de-
fine the premiums as being equal to the expected claims. In essence, this assumes
that insurance is “costless.” In reality, the costs of insurance are non-zero, because
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of the need for administrative costs, profits, and risk premiums. An assumption
of costless insurance may be reasonable for a risk-neutral public insurance pro-
gram that incurs only administrative costs. For private insurance, the costs are
likely to be higher because of the need for profit and the charging of a risk pre-
mium. In Mechler and Plug (2002), the functional form of the premium loading
factor (PLF) is simply PLF=1+0.03Tr. We compute premium payments in a fash-
ion similar to Mechler and Pflug by charging a risk premium for low-probability
events. However, the functional form identified above raises the questions of which
return period to use to compute the premium loading factor: the return period of
the underlying event or the return period of the loss. The use of the return period
of the event is equivalent to the highly conservative assumption that variability in
the insurers’ losses is dominated by the variability in this particular policy. The
return period of the insurers’ losses is probably the appropriate parameter to use.
However, this requires data on the full portfolio of the insurer. A well structured
insurance portfolio would not allow itself to be exposed to such an extent, and the
risks of the flood would be spread among risks associated with the other policies is-
sued by the insurer. We therefore charge the risk premium a constant, user-defined
premium loading factor. We note that for a company underwriting with significant
catastrophic risks, combining the different catastrophes into an integrated catastro-
phe model may be an efficient way of determining an appropriate premium loading
factor. However, such an analysis must be a part of future work. The expected
claim payments are simply the probability-weighted claim payments. The use of a
risk premium adds the premium loading factor, such that the annual premiums are
simply taken to be the expected claims adjusted by the PLF. The accumulated insur-
ance reserve is simply the accumulated premiums minus the claim payment at the
time of the catastrophe. If the premiums collected are sufficient to cover the claims,
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the insurance reserve is positive and the premiums have been “overpaid.” If the pre-
miums collected are insufficient to cover the claims, then the insurance reserve is
negative and the claims are “underpaid.” The losses retained by the policyholder
are simply the damage minus the claims.
Retained Loss=max (0, Damage - Claims).
5.3.3 Reserve Fund
We assume that the reserve fund is invested in a relatively safe security, such as
bonds. The reserve fund has two components: a one-time initial investment and a
constant annual payment.
Accumulated Funds = Initial Reserve Fund*((1+Yield)τ )
+Annual Payment*(((1+Yieldτ ))-1)/Yield;
The growth of the reserve fund with a AC10m initial contribution, a AC1m annual
contribution, and a 5 percent rate of interest is shown in Figure 5.6.
The difference between the contribution and the balance represents the benefit
of the reserve fund. It can be seen that benefit is quite small for short time horizons
(<10 years), but increases significantly thereafter because of compounding.
A significant methodological question is the “cost” of the reserve fund, a ques-
tion related to the “cost” of capital. This is a difficult question, discussed at length
in Kielholz (2000). Typically, this is evaluated by measuring the opportunity cost
of investing in a safe investment versus a more profitable but more volatile invest-
ment such as equities. The equity premium might therefore be used to determine
the “cost” of the capital. However, this can be misleading. Equities are typically
considered to be more volatile and thus to carry a higher downside risk than bonds
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(whether this is true or not when measured in real terms, depending upon the hold-
ing period, is not clear). A probabilistic assessment might show that there is a
significant probability that the equity premium is, in fact, negative, as would be the
case if equities underperformed bonds (as has occurred several times over the past
century). In this case, there may actually be a “negative” cost associated with hold-
ing the funds in a reserve fund. Essentially, one might inadvertently profit from a
forced investment in a less volatile investment. One need only consider the financial
history of the last several years to provide an illustration of such a phenomenon.
As we have chosen to integrate financial uncertainties with structural uncer-
tainties, we have modeled the yield of the reserve fund as a random variable. In-
formation on the potential uncertainties of investment yield can be obtained from
Dimson et al. (2002), who present data on the performance of bonds and equi-
ties over a century from many different markets. As the uncertainties in yields are
expected to be a function of how long the investments are held, we illustrate the
concept of equity premium in Figure 5.7 showing the real (inflation-adjusted) rate
of returns to bonds and equities in two markets with relatively good records over
the past century (Switzerland and the United States), a developed economy that has
suffered two period of devastating inflation (Germany), as well as world aggregate
values.
It is clear that, on average, equities outperform bonds. Swiss equities have
provided a fairly stable 5 percent real rate of return when held for periods of 10
years or more, in comparison with typical bond returns of less than 3 percent. The
traditional argument for holding a reserve fund in bonds rather than equities is that
bonds are less volatile than equities and carry less downside risk. In other words,
money invested in bonds is expected to be safer and more likely to be available
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when needed than the same amount invested in bonds would be. We can explore
this hypothesis by examining the volatility of these same instruments, which we
define as the standard deviation of the rates of return. The results are shown below.
The impression that bonds are much safer than equities does not appear to be
valid when inflation is taken into account and the volatility of real rather than nom-
inal rates of return is examined. We can see that, in general, bonds are only slightly
less volatile than equities when inflation is taken into account. This is because the
variability in inflation becomes a controlling factor when the other uncertainties
are made low. We note that if countries experiencing significant disruptions (e.g.,
Germany) are included, bonds can even have negative average yields with high
volatility.
We wish to acknowledge that there is much work that has been done in this field
and that this is only a very simple approach. However, it does illustrate that the
trade-off between yield and volatility in the choice of an investment is not simple.
In this paper, we have taken an approach that emphasizes this point by investing the
reserve fund in a “conservative” equity, thereby emphasizing that the opportunity
costs of a fund are sensitively dependent on the choice of the baseline used for
determining the value of the foregone alternative. Furthermore, if it is assumed
that the performance of a reserve fund is not affected by the occurrence of a flood,
one may decide that the low base probability of a flood offsets the potential for
low returns. The value of the catastrophe model is precisely that it allows such
trade-offs to be made explicitly and to be examined.
We have therefore chosen to have our hypothetical reserve fund invested in
a “safe” equity. We take this equity as having a real rate of return characterized
by an average yield of 5 percent and a standard deviation given by the regression
σ = τ−0.7889.
The comparison between the synthetic yields that we have generated and the
observed performance of Swiss equities is shown below. As the uncertainty in
yields can be quite large for short holding periods (less than 10 years4), we show
both linear and log scales.
5.3.4 Borrowing
We implement post-disaster borrowing with an extremely simple model. The cost
of a loan is simply the difference between the amount borrowed and the amount
repaid, and is a standard computation shown below. We take the period to be a
4This relation would not be expected to hold true for very short periods, as the range of potential
returns starting in any given year would be constrained and thus not as dramatic as shown here.
The inaccuracy induced by the use of this relationship is substantially mitigated by the low level of
compounding over shorter periods in relation to longer periods. However, a more rigorous treatment
of the uncertainty in yields would be necessary if this study were to be applied to short planning
periods.
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fixed 30 years and assume that the average loan interest rate of 4 percent (real), and
allow the interest rate to be an uncertain random variable that can range between
2 and 6 percent real at a 2σ confidence level. We note that these are unfavorable
terms, albeit not unreasonably so. An agent of the Austrian government, given
a good credit standing and alternative financial resources, would probably not be
required to pay such rates or to amortize the loan over such a long period. These
values are chosen somewhat arbitrarily but are intended to emphasize the fact that
borrowing is also a mitigation measure with substantial costs and that the decision
not to mitigate may be an implicit decision to assume a loan at whatever terms may
be obtainable if a disaster occurs.
6
Results
In this chapter we will examine the consequences of implementing a number of dif-
ferent mitigation measures using the simple integrated model we have constructed.
These mitigation measures are built up from combinations of remedial alternatives.
The goal of this section is to examine the impact of selected decisions regarding
mitigation of flood risks to the subway. There are, in principle, a number of pos-
sible alternatives. Two of the structural alternatives that are being implemented,
as discussed previously, are upgrades to the detention basins and installation of a
portable flood barrier at the entrances to the underground portions of the U4.
6.1 Structural Measures
A no-action alternative was considered to establish a base case. The no-action
alternative essentially considers the pre-1990 conditions. It was presumed that the
detention basins are in place but that no measures are taken to allow operability.
The flood basins fill and empty passively. The masonry floodwall is also assumed
to be in place. It is assumed that if damage occurs, the losses will be covered by a
loan. As discussed in the previous chapter, the loan is assumed to be a 30-year loan
with a real interest rate of between 2 and 6 percent. It is assumed that unlimited
credit is available. Alternative 1 is the installation of a portable flood barrier at the
openings to the covered sections of the metro. The effect of these flood barriers is
to limit inundation of downstream reaches. As these systems can be expected to
have a reliability of less than 100 percent, it is assumed that they have a failure-on-
demand rate of 25 percent. In other words, they are assumed to fail only once in
every four events requiring their installation. As there is no empirical or theoretical
basis for this assumption, the effect of the reliability of these flood barriers on
the results will be examined. Furthermore, it is assumed that the installation of
these systems costs AC100,000 and AC10,000 per year to maintain. This is simply an
estimate of the costs associated with two person-months of design services and two
person-months of construction and testing costs, combined with a materials cost
of AC50,000. Annual operating costs (inspection, testing, and occasional repair) are
assumed to be 10 percent of installation costs. These costs can be specified by
the user. Alternative 2 comprises upgrading the basins to allow controlled filling
and release of floodwater. The system is discussed in more detail in Faber (2003).
This system, coupled with a real-time flood-forecasting system, is currently being
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Figure 6.1. Examination of structural alternatives.
installed to increase the level of protection against extremely rare floods. The costs
for this alternative are based on Neukirchen (1994), who reported an estimate of
AC8m and operating costs that are expected to be 1 percent of installation costs. To
emphasize the fact that this is an illustrative example, we have rounded this value
up to AC10m. The combined scenario represents the combination of portable flood
barriers and detention basin upgrades. The results of these scenarios are shown in
Figure 6.1.
For the base-case, no-action alternative, it can be seen that over a 50-year pe-
riod, there is approximately a 3 percent chance that damage could be incurred.
However, because of the uncertainty in the rainfall, the range in annual probabil-
ities in which damage might be incurred would range between 0.3 percent (at a
10 percent confidence level) and 15 percent (with a 90 percent confidence level).
The expected damage over this period is approximately AC5m. Because of loan ser-
vicing costs, the expected total costs are higher and amount to AC8.6m. However,
examination of the curve illustrates the problem of using an expected damage in
this case. The distribution of damage is not a single mode distribution. Instead, it
essentially represents a combination of a large (∼97 percent) chance of no damage
and a small chance of very great damage. The expected value does not represent
a central tendency of this distribution. The risk curve illustrates this by demon-
strating that while the chance of damage above zero is approximately 3 percent (on
average), the chance that damage is greater than AC100m is approximately 1 percent.
We once again note that this is not a realistic scenario for the city of Vienna.
Structural mitigation measures are being installed. More significantly, a variety of
other measures would likely be available to cover the repair costs. These could
include diversion and contributions from the city or federal government. If a loan
is required, the interest rate is not expected to be as high as that assumed here
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(particularly if it was covered by a bond issue) or the term to be so long. However,
these financial parameters may be more reasonable for a city in the developing
world with fewer financial resources, a poorer credit rating, and no plans for struc-
tural mitigation measures. It is important to keep in mind that, as discussed in the
Introduction, this is an illustrative study. It is not intended to provide concrete pol-
icy recommendations for the city of Vienna without there being considerable im-
provements in the data and extensive consultation with decision makers to develop
realistic alternatives.
Examination of Alternative 1 reveals that, relative to the base case, the floodgate
does not alter the probability at which damage will start to occur. The probability
of damage exceeding zero is about 3 percent, unchanged from the base case. What
does change is the damage at lower probabilities. The probability that the dam-
age is limited to less than AC50m are lowered to approximately 0.5 percent, and the
chance of damages exceeding AC100m is considerably less than 0.1 percent. The
expected damage from this case is approximately AC2 ME, with expected total costs
of AC4.1m. The plot clearly shows that the primary role of the floodgate is to limit
rather than prevent damage. Using the expanded concept of risk, we can say that
the floodgate primarily addresses the consequences of an event rather than the prob-
ability. If risk is defined simply as system failure without distinction between large
failure and small failure, the floodgates are ineffective. However, it is clear from
the plot that the floodgates do have a major impact in limiting the damage and may
be able to limit damage to an “affordable” level.
Examination of Alternative 2 shows that, as intended, the upgraded detention
basins lower the probability at which damage will start to occur. The expected
probability of damage exceeding 0 drops from 3 percent to slightly over 1.5 per-
cent. However, once damage occurs, it is catastrophic. This is because a storm
large enough to overwhelm the detention capacity of the basins would cause major
damage to an unprotected subway system. Furthermore, construction and operation
costs must be added to the catastrophic costs to yield the total cost of dealing with
flooding. This means that there is a 100 percent chance that total costs will exceed
AC10m, and there is a 1 percent chance that total costs will exceed AC100m. The ex-
pected damage is reduced from AC5m to AC3m, but the expected total costs increase
from AC8.6 to 18m. The plot clearly shows that the primary role of the detention
basins is to prevent rather than limit damage. From a risk-analytic perspective, we
can identify this as a measure that primarily affects the probability of an event. If
risk is defined simply as avoiding adverse consequences at all costs, this alternative
would not be considered acceptable. However, it is clear from the graph that the
basins do have a significant effect on the likelihood of damage being incurred. If
a decision maker is unconcerned with potential damage below a certain level of
likelihood, this type of alternative may be appropriate.
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Finally, the combined alternative captures some of the desirable elements of the
single approach, albeit at the cost of also including some of the drawbacks. Dam-
age is limited by the floodgate and its likelihood is reduced by the detention basins.
In addition, the uncertainty surrounding the losses is decreased. The expected dam-
age is reduced to AC1.2m, with a very low probability that the damage will exceed
AC100m. The expected total cost is approximately AC16m.
6.2 Financial Measures
The first financial measure to be considered is insurance. The structure of a po-
tential insurance policy was discussed in a previous chapter. Here, we set up a
hypothetical insurance policy. The insurance policy variables are all decision vari-
ables, so there is no basis for selecting any particular set of combinations without
knowing the decision maker’s preference. In this case, we choose to have a AC10m
deductible, a 10 percent coinsurance rate, a AC500m claims cap, and a premium
loading factor of 100 percent (meaning that premiums are collected which are ex-
pected to be double the expected value of the claims, reflecting the risks borne by
the insurer in offering a policy against such a catastrophic event). The results are
shown below. For purposes of comparison, a 1,000 percent premium loading factor
is also shown (reflecting a premium set to be equal to 10 times the expected claims
payment, which is illustrative of a highly risk-averse or poorly diversified insurer).
The second financial mechanism is a reserve fund, the structure of which was
discussed above. Again, many of the policy variables are decision variables, so
there is no basis for selecting any particular set of combinations without knowing
the decision maker’s preference. In this case, we have chosen a set of variables
to mimic the costs of the more expensive structural measure by assuming a one-
time investment of AC10m and an annual contribution of AC0.1m. We assume that
these funds are invested in a “safe” equity, which we benchmark as similar to the
performance of Swiss equities. We note that the investment of the reserve fund
in equities rather than bonds technically eliminates the cost of this option. The
real costs would be those associated with lack of liquidity, which are beyond the
scope of this analysis. The combined financial alternative represents a strategy
mixing an insurance policy with aAC10m deductible, aAC500m cap, and a 20 percent
coinsurance rate, with a reserve fund comprising a one-time initial contribution of
AC1m and an annual contribution of AC10,000. The computed annual premiums are
similar to those of the pure case at AC150,000 (slightly lower because of the higher
coinsurance rate), and the expected total costs are AC minus 2m, representing the
possibility that a profit is expected on the basis of no flood occurring and on the
profit being taken from the interest accumulated over 50 years on the reserve fund.
The results of these simulations are shown in Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2. Financial measures.
In the insurance-only scenario, the expected damage is unchanged (as expected)
from the base case, and premiums of AC170,000 per year are computed using this
premium loading factor. The expected total costs, including premium payment up
to the time of the catastrophe, are AC8m. With the higher (and probably more likely)
premium loading factor of 1,000 percent, the premiums are close to AC1m per year
and the expected total costs are therefore quite high, at AC34m. However, it can be
seen that insurance has a remarkably similar effect (from a purely financial per-
spective) to a floodgate. Upon reflection, the reason for this is clear. Insurance is
intended to limit rather than prevent losses. It can do this quite effectively. Exami-
nation of the uncertainty bands also shows the role of insurance as an uncertainty-
reducing mechanism. In comparison with floodgates, the insurance policy reduces
the uncertainty quite effectively (by passing it on to the insurer in the form of a
contract). However, this case also illustrates the drawback to insurance, which is
that it can be an expensive option if the event fails to happen, with the costs being
sensitively dependent upon the premium loading factor. Another significant factor,
which is not illustrated by this plot, is the risk that the insurer may withdraw cover-
age. If a structural measure is put in place, the decision maker retains more control
over the mitigation option. If an insurer withdraws coverage or goes bankrupt, then
the policy holder is placed back in the position from which he/she started with no
benefit from the policy and no future protection.
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The reserve fund reveals a somewhat startling feature in comparison with the
other alternatives. It is clear that it does nothing (in common with all financial mea-
sures) to reduce damage. What it does do is to shift the loss curve to the extent that
damage can be compensated for from accumulated funds. The fund also mitigates
the effect of loan costs in the sense that funds taken from the reserve fund do not
accrue interest penalties. This lowers the probability of costs exceeding zero to
something slightly greater than 1.5 percent. However, costs can still be quite high,
having a 0.8 percent likelihood of exceeding AC100m. On the other hand, there is
a strong chance that the flood will not happen and that, ultimately, the interest on
the reserve fund can be either taken as a profit or invested in other loss-reduction
mechanisms. For this case study, this effect is dominant because there is a signifi-
cant chance of no disaster occurring at all over the time period concerned. In this
case, the interest earned on the invested funds represents a profit. This illustrates
the importance of the concept of risk as including potentially positive outcomes as
well as negative outcomes. Even if an event occurs, the accumulated funds may
be able to cover the costs if the event is not exceptionally severe. It can be seen
that the probability of uncovered losses exceeding zero also drop because there is a
significant probability that the accumulated funds will be large enough to cover the
losses. A somewhat hidden but significant feature is that the loss-reduction prop-
erties of a reserve fund are amplified by the avoidance of high interest costs. By
lowering the principal outstanding on a potential loan, the reserve fund is able to
avoid loan costs. However, the catastrophic loss-limiting functions of this mech-
anism are very limited. For an organization facing potentially ruinous losses, the
reserve fund does not eliminate its exposure in the way that an insurance policy
might. Another significant contrast with insurance is that a reserve fund not only
does not reduce uncertainties, but that it can even increase them (albeit often in
a positive direction). Finally, two drawbacks not illustrated by this plot are the
time dependency of the protection offered and the political risk that the fund will
be diverted to other uses rather than being allowed to accrue interest. As a long
time period of interest was chosen, there is a significant chance of accruing a large
balance in the reserve fund. If a short time period was chosen (say, 10 years), the
results might look quite different.
A clear feature of the combined financial alternative is that it brings together
the low uncertainty of the insurance policy with the profit-generating possibilities
of the reserve fund, a point illustrated by the graph. The benefit of a highly loaded
insurance policy, on the other hand, would not be as high, although the reserve fund
might be designed to offset some of the losses associated with premium payments.
Of course, this combined alternative is subject to the same non-quantified risks dis-
cussed for the single solutions. An attractive element of this combination, however,
is the possibility of an immediate risk reduction by the purchase of an insurance
policy that takes effect upon purchase. The accumulated funds in the reserve fund
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Figure 6.3. Total costs at time of catastrophe (million AC): (a) structural measures
and insurance; (b) mixed scenarios.
can help to offset the risk that the insurer may choose to withdraw coverage at some
point in the future, as sufficient funds may have accumulated by that point to cover
any possible catastrophe.
6.3 Mixed Measures
A final set of three scenarios combines structural measures with both financial
measures, singly and in full combination. This comprises a scenario combining
structural measures with insurance (Figure 6.3a) and a scenario combining struc-
tural measures and both financial measures. For this alternative, we combine the
structural measures with an insurance policy, as defined above, with a 100 percent
premium loading factor.
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For the structural + insurance scenario, the computed premiums are only
AC30,000 (provided, of course, that an insurer would be willing to offer insurance
at that rate) (Figure 6.3b). The installation of the floodgate and the upgrading of
the detention basins have lowered the expected claims, allowing reduced insurance
premiums. The expected damage is AC1.1m per year, with expected total costs of
AC16m. An important aspect of this alternative over the purely structural combined
alternative is that the uncertainty has been significantly reduced. Expected total
costs are similar, possibly reflecting the fact that the savings in loan servicing costs
of exceptionally large loans will offset the cost of insurance. The real appeal lies
in the fully combined scenario. The expected damage is now AC1.1m, leading to
annual premiums of AC30,000. The expected total costs are AC3.5m, down from ap-
proximately AC8.6m in the base case. Potential total costs are limited to well under
AC50m, and even considering uncertainty, are not expected to rise above AC100m,
regardless of the size of the flood. We can see that this approach blends all of the
approaches, to yield a solution in which the advantages of each solution offset many
of the disadvantages of the single solutions. The inclusion of insurance offsets the
uncertainties associated with the other options. The inclusion of a modest reserve
fund helps to avoid the potential for lost funds associated with construction of a
structural measure that may never be called upon to function. The detention basin
upgrades and installation of the flood barrier reduce expected claims to the point
that insurance premiums are modest. Inclusion of a sensitivity analysis shows that
even if the premium loading factor is increased to 1,000 percent (premiums = 10 x
expected claims), the premiums are still only AC160,000 and the total costs are ap-
proximately the same as in the no-action alternative, with the potential losses still
being drastically reduced.
7
Discussion and Conclusions
Our primary conclusion is that the implementation of a concept of risk that in-
tegrates the different technical perspectives on risk into a unified framework is
feasible and yields valuable insights into the nature of the protection provided by
different mitigation alternatives. This implementation of an integrated concept of
risk is achieved by identifying a clear assessment variable (total ex ante and ex post
costs of mitigating flood damage) and expressing the probability distribution of this
variable under different mitigation scenarios using a stochastic complementary cu-
mulative distribution function or “risk curve.” This approach provides considerable
additional relevant information to a decision maker. It also allows the problem to
be structured in such a way that it provides a clearer indication of the advantages
and disadvantages of different mitigation options. This has been demonstrated by
examining a current problem faced by decision makers and using, to the maximum
extent possible, accurate and relevant data. We further note that the results highlight
the fact that the advantages and disadvantages of a particular proposed mitigation
option are complex and cannot always be reduced to a single-valued metric such as
expected benefit or system reliability, as is typical of the actuarial and probabilistic
approach, respectively. However, technical approaches need not rely on a single-
valued metric. The portrayal of losses in terms of a stochastic risk curve, rather
than a single-valued metric, provides considerable additional information without
an undue level of complexity. For disciplines focused on the concept of risk as
primarily probability (e.g., probability of suffering a financing gap or probability
of system failure), we note that consequences matter. A failure that results in only
minor damage or a financial option that results in only a minor financing gap is sig-
nificantly different from one that results in catastrophic damage or an uncloseable
financing gap, even if that failure or that gap is slightly more likely. The use of a risk
curve can distinguish these and allow informed decisions. For analysts whose stud-
ies typically focus on expected values that combine probability and consequence
into a single metric, we note that some options appear to be oriented toward the
reduction of epistemic uncertainty. For example, a decision maker who is highly
averse to uncertainty may consider insurance as a viable option, given that the fun-
damental nature of insurance is to transform an uncertain large loss into a certain
smaller loss. As in any decision problem, the decision maker must be aware of
his/her goals and constraints and not allow the analytical tools of the component
disciplines to define the problem for him.
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A second finding of the study is that although structural (loss-preventing) and fi-
nancial (loss-spreading) mitigation measures may have significantly different char-
acteristics, they may still be examined in a consistent way if an appropriate measure
of risk can be identified. This is closely connected to the use of a broader con-
ception of risk that identifies the strengths and weaknesses of different mitigation
measures. Understanding the comparative strengths and weaknesses of different
instruments can assist in the design of a system in which the advantages of some
measures are used to offset the disadvantages of others, thereby reducing and con-
trolling the risks. For example, the explicit treatment of epistemic and aleatory
uncertainty allowed clarification of the different characteristics of reserve funds
versus insurance. In this case, the reserve fund served to reduce (or even offset)
the cost of ex post borrowing, although it provided essentially no protection against
very large events and did not reduce the uncertainty in the loss curve. The effect of
the reserve fund was to shift the risk curve in a beneficial direction at all probability
levels. On the other hand, insurance provided protection against the relatively larger
and less likely losses and reduced the uncertainty associated with the large events.
The effect of the floodgate was similar to that of insurance in that losses from very
rare events were reduced; however, insurance was clearly more effective at reduc-
ing the uncertainty of large losses at the expense of increasing costs. Both of these
were quite different from the type of protection provided by the detention basins,
which served to reduce the probability of losses but were subject to considerable
uncertainty about the losses when the capacity of the basins could be overwhelmed
by beyond design-basis storms. The synergistic effects of combined measures were
apparent in that the use of structural measures assisted in mitigating the major draw-
back of insurance (the high cost) by reducing expected losses, while the insurance
policy managed the residual uncertainty associated with the structural measures.
Moreover, the effect of a reserve fund was enhanced when combined with loss-
reduction techniques that extended the potential for accumulating adequate reserve
funds. In this case, we were able to demonstrate that by using plausible values and
realistic options drawn from a real flood-risk-management problem, considerable
reduction in the total cost of mitigating flood damage may be achieved through a
combination of structural measures with financial measures.
Several methodological issues arose during the course of the study. One was
that integrating inputs from several disciplines into a single analysis, not surpris-
ingly, can be challenging in practice. Even in the course of an integrated study, the
proper way to link the output of the hydraulic model to the damage model was not
clear. Although a solution was found at the end, the study may have looked quite
different if the approach ultimately adopted had been used at the outset.1 This
1It should be noted that this is one of the benefits of performing such a study in an academic rather
than a consulting framework. Consulting studies typically do not have the luxury of implementing
major model revisions during the course of the analysis. The consulting team must start with a clear
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is mainly because of the different approaches to conceptualizing the risk analysis
problem in the contributing disciplines. It is incumbent on analysts in such studies
to understand the assumptions, limitations, and data requirements of the interfac-
ing disciplines sufficiently to be able to communicate effectively. However, this
suggests that integration is not simply a process of completing the component anal-
yses and then combining them at the end. Considerable communication is required
throughout the process to ensure that the necessary learning processes occur. Aca-
demic studies can help in this regard by providing templates and examples of how
such integration might take place. Another issue that arose late in the study were
the challenges to quantifying the “cost” of a reserve fund in a probabilistic way. The
concept of opportunity cost, which is a traditional approach in cost-benefit analy-
ses, is a simple concept in deterministic terms but considerably more complex to
implement in probabilistic terms, when the “cost” can be negative. Finally, we note
that we have approached the treatment of epistemic uncertainty in financial param-
eters from a very empirical, theoretical, engineering-oriented perspective, as the
background of the primary authors is largely an engineering one. Our approach to
uncertainty was quite consistent with what Renn (1992) has observed as the dom-
inant technical paradigm of using relative frequencies (observed or modeled) as a
way of specifying probabilities. Considerable improvements may be obtained by
treating financial uncertainties using tools that are more widely accepted within the
financial community.
There were significant limitations in this study; these suggest areas where con-
siderable improvement could be made to the approach presented here. Although
there are certainly many areas for improvement, it is the authors’ opinion that the
two major technical limitations of this study are the lack of specific accounting for
the time preference of losses (i.e., no discounting) and the lack of a more thorough
investigation of the “cost” of a reserve fund. An appropriate method of discount-
ing for this problem was not identified. It was felt that the standard engineering
cost-estimation approach of geometric discounting was inappropriate2 because of
the relatively long time horizons used. Use of even a moderate discount rate would
tend to obscure the impact of large events occurring more than a few decades in
the future. However, it is precisely these rare, costly, and infrequent events with
analytical approach before data are collected and simulations performed, or the study will quickly
run over budget and over schedule. At worst, the consulting study may be delayed to the point that it
cannot be used for a decision that must be made quickly.
2On the other hand, it was realized that if the losses are associated with replacement of items with
a value that depreciates because of wear and obsolescence, and would be replaced or renewed on a
regular basis with or without a flood, then high discount rates may be quite appropriate. In this case,
the effect of a flood would be more related to the issue of cash flow, and an alternate metric (such as
maximum annual cost rather than total cost incurred) might be more appropriate. This highlights the
need to fully understand the objectives and goals of the decision maker before conducting an applied
analysis.
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which we are concerned. The decision not to discount was an explicit decision
on the part of the lead author of this report. A major improvement to this study
would be an examination of alternative methods for discounting future losses from
catastrophic events. Moreover, as previously discussed, a full examination of the
“cost” of a reserve fund in the context of a study that includes epistemic uncertainty
was not carried out. The difficulties of applying the concept of opportunity cost for
valuing the cost of a reserve fund were not fully appreciated at the outset and did
not become apparent until the study was nearing completion. We also note that we
have made no attempt at optimization in this analysis, largely because optimization
requires a clear statement of the goals to be achieved and the constraints that are
faced. Rather than hypothesize about what these might be, we consider that such
parameters are best developed in consultation with the decision makers.
We may return at this point to Renn’s discussion of the limitations of technical
risk analyses. He identifies four major criticisms of the technical perspectives on
risk: first, what people perceive as an undesirable effect depends on their values and
preferences; second, the interactions between human activities and consequences
are uniquely more complex than the average probabilities used in technical risk
analyses are able to capture; third, the institutional structure of managing and con-
trolling risks is prone to organizational failures and deficits which may increase the
actual risk; and fourth, the numerical combination of magnitude and probabilities
assumes equal weight for both components. On the other hand, he asserts that the
the narrowness of this approach contains both its weakness and its strength and
that the exclusion of social context and meaning from technical risk analysis pro-
vides an abstraction that enhances the intersubjective validity of the results but at
the price of neglecting the social processing of risk.
Although these criticisms are well taken, we believe that it is also useful to dis-
tinguish between fundamental weaknesses and applied weakness. Several of the
criticisms of technical risk analyses do not appear to be fundamental to quantitative
simulation modeling. In particular, this study has addressed the fourth weakness
and demonstrated that this is a problem more in the application than in the fun-
damental approach of technical analyses. The use of single-valued metrics that
numerically combine probability and consequences are not necessary for the con-
duct of a technical risk analysis. On the other hand, we do recognize that the use of
single-valued metrics is extremely common in practice. Overcoming this applied
weakness will not be a trivial task. Several of the other criticisms, namely, that dif-
ferent individuals may value negative outcomes differently and that the institutional
measures are subject to organizational failures, can also be partially addressed by
improvements in the application of simulation techniques by developing models
capable of quantifying the outcomes of concern to different stakeholders and by
including terms for human or organizational failure. However, as quantification is
a fundamental aspect of simulation modeling, these concerns probably cannot be
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completely addressed within a technical framework. In some cases, the nature of
the problem may be such that quantitative analysis is simply not the best tool for
managing risk.
However, the virtue of exercises such as these is that they allow the impact of
different potential goals and constraints to be examined systematically—at least to
the extent to which the concerns of different stakeholders can be quantified. The
value of such flexibility may become particularly apparent in situations where mul-
tiple stakeholders, with different objectives and constraints, must negotiate to de-
termine a jointly acceptable solution. This advantage is hinted at by Walker (1997),
and it is precisely this aspect of catastrophe modeling that is explored within the
Tisza River study by Ekenberg et al. (2003) and Brouwers (2003). Approaches to
scenario construction and goal/constraint identification within a negotiated environ-
ment are being pursued within the Risk, Modeling, and Society Project at IIASA.
Furthermore, the optimization techniques explored by Ermoliev et al. (2000) and
Ermolieva et al. (2001) may allow the use of integrated models in a close-to-real-
time environment during meetings and negotiations. Evaluation of the character-
istics of alternative financial instruments are being pursued by Mechler and Pflug
(2002).3 It is hoped that this study will contribute to the goals of the project by
demonstrating an integrative framework that includes multiple forms of uncertainty,
clarifies the characteristics of different mitigation alternatives, and deals with both
structural and financial mitigation options on a consistent basis. It remains to future
work to weave together the disparate strands of full treatment of uncertainty, inte-
gration of spatially explicit structural and non-structural mitigation options, fast
optimization, and stakeholder negotiation to achieve the integrative possibilities
that are now only potential in this type of analysis.
3The model is described fully in Mechler et al. (2006) and Hochrainer (2006).
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